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BOOK REVIEW
CAUSE LAWYERING FOR
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT. By Samuel R. Bagenstos. New Haven & London: Yale
Univ. Press. 2009. Pp. xii, 228. $48.00.

Reviewed by Michael Ashley Stein,*
Michael E. Waterstone, ** and David B. Wilkins***
I. INTRODUCTION

Passed with great flourish, 1 the Americans with Disabilities Act2
(ADA) was heralded as an "emancipation proclamation" for Americans
with disabilities. 3 Nevertheless, twenty years after its enactment the
overall socioeconomic status of persons with disabilities in the United
States is tenuous. 4 In particular, notwithstanding the express requirement that employers provide reasonable workplace accommodations
for qualified individuals with disabilities, nearly all empirical analyses
conclude that the relative employment rates of disabled persons has
not improved significantly since the statute's passage. 5 Consequently,
academics and policymakers alike continue to question the ADA's abil-

* Executive Director, Harvard Law School Project on Disability; Cabell Professor, William &
Mary Law School.
** Professor and Associate Dean of Academic Programs, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
*** Lester Kissel Professor of Law, Vice Dean for Global Initiatives on the Legal Profession and
Director of the Program on the Legal Profession, Harvard Law School. We thank William Alford, Rick Hasen, James Moliterno, and Doug NeJaime for their comments; and Cara Boekeloo,
Laura Jacobson, and especially Jason Silverstein for research assistance. Professor Stein's research was sponsored in part by a grant from Foundation Open Society (Zug).
1 See, e.g., George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1068 Guly 26, 1990) (stating that the ADA "is the world's first comprehensive declaration of equality for people with disabilities').
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
3 1\vo senators used this phrase. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin); 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
4 For example, the 2005 employment rate among working-age people with disabilities was
38%, and the poverty rate among the same group was 25%. CORNELL UNIV. REHAB. RESEARCH AND TRAINING CTR. ON DISABILITY DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATISTICS, DISABILITY STATUS REPORTS (2005), available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/edildisabilitystatisticsl
StatusReports/2005-html/2o05-StatusReports_US.html.
5 See THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) (collecting empirical studies).
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ity as a policy instrument to achieve true equality for Americans with
disabilities. 6
The results of claims brought under the statute appear to confirm
this gloomy assessment. In 2008, lawsuits brought under Title I's employment provisions' lost before federal trial courts approximately
g8% of the time. 8 By contrast, claims under Title II of the statute regarding access to state and local government services9 and under Title
III's provisions regarding access to public accommodations 10 have met
with some success. 11 This thematic divide is reflected at the Supreme
Court, where nearly every claimant alleging disability-based employment discrimination has lost, and nearly every other plaintiff seeking
relief under the statute has won.
Given this track record, it is not surprising that, almost since its
enactment, scholars have been critical of the ADA. These criticisms
typically fall within one of three broad camps: that the statute is poorly written and structurally flawed; 12 that the ADA has been betrayed
by judicial backlash; 13 or that disability-based workplace accommodations are inefficient and create disincentives to employing disabled persons. 14
In Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement,
Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos moves beyond these standard critiques
to provide a more nuanced - and for disability rights advocates, an
ultimately more unsettling - explanation of the ADA's failure to
6 See, e.g., ADA Notification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3590 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o6th Cong. 61 (2000).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ I211I-I2117.
8 AM. BAR ASS'N, 2008 EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA TITLE I - SUR·
VEY UPDATE (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/disability/docsf2oo9TitleiSurvey.pdf.
The American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law (on which
two of the authors served as Commissioners) has provided annual tallies since 1997. The only
lower recorded win-loss rate in federal court is for prisoner rights cases. Samuel R. Bagenstos,
"Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA.
L. REV. 825, 9Io--11 (2003).
9 42 u.s.c. §§ I2I31-I2I34·
10 I d. §§ I2 I8I-I2 I89.
11 See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
58 VAND. L. REv. I807, I826-30 (2005) (noting that Title II and Title III claims have been more
successful than Title I claims at the trial level).
12 See, e.g., Charles Lane, O'Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST,
Mar. IS, 2002, at A2 (noting that the legislative sponsors were "so eager to get something passed
that what passes hasn't been as carefully written as a group of law professors might put together')
(quoting Justice O'Connor speaking extrajudicially).
13 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword- Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 2 I BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. I (2000), revised and reprinted in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003).
14 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 48Q--94 (I992).
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achieve its lofty goals. Bagenstos rejects the claim that Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area, including decisions with which he disagrees,
is either the byproduct of judicial backlash or of inartfully crafted legislation. Instead, he argues that a central reason for the ADA's limited
success is the inherent plurality of the disability rights movement itself.
This diversity of interests, Bagenstos claims, has created tensions
within the movement's goals. In turn, when adjudicating the ADA,
the Rehnquist Courtl 5 (including, at times, Justices appointed by both
parties) selected interpretations of the scope of disability rights from
among a competing set of principles articulated by members of this
"large and contentious" movement (p. x). For example, strands of disability rights thinking support that Court's narrow definition of disability and its restrictions on the accommodation requirement (pp. s6). Given these internal tensions, Bagenstos urges disability rights advocates to move beyond the antidiscrimination paradigm that has
largely informed their approach to the ADA. Although he supports a
number of traditional litigation-based reforms (such as reinstating
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to incentivize private enforcement), Bagenstos argues that an alternative for advancing the interests of people
with disabilities lies in universalist mechanisms exogenous to the statute - notably, extending public and private health care coverage.
In highlighting the internal contradictions within the disability
rights movement, Bagenstos has made a unique and important contribution to our understanding of what has happened to the ADA, particularly with respect to its fate in the Supreme Court. But by calling
attention to these tensions, Bagenstos implicitly raises an even more
fundamental question: given that internal divisions have undermined
the movement's goals, why have disability rights advocates failed to
develop strategies for bridging - or at the very least, camouflaging their differences in order to present a more effective, united front?
As recent scholarship makes clear, the disability rights movement is
far from unique in harboring significant internal contradictions within
its ranks. Although prior struggles on behalf of other groups such as
blacks or women are often portrayed as unproblematic expressions of
the universal yearnings of oppressed people to be free, we now know
that this hagiography often glosses over deep internal tensions that
frequently threatened to derail these campaigns. 16 Yet notwithstand15 The one ADA case the Roberts Court has had occasion to consider is United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). This unanimous decision did not break significant ground in terms of
ADA jurisprudence, essentially reiterating - though declining to expand or narrow - the Rehnquist Court's decision two years earlier in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). We therefore
focus our discussion on the Rehnquist Court.
16 Compare, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975), and
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ing these deep divisions, advocates for the rights of blacks, women,
and, most recently, gays and lesbians have been able to achieve substantial victories in the Supreme Court. Disability rights advocates, as
Bagenstos ably demonstrates, have not been able to achieve similar
success.
In this Review, we suggest one possible explanation for this difference: the almost complete absence of disability rights "cause lawyers"
in the ADA cases that have gone to the Supreme Court. 17 By "cause
lawyers" we mean attorneys who spend a significant amount of their
professional time designing and bringing cases that seek to benefit various categories of people with disabilities and who have formal connections with disability rights organizations. 18 Over the first two decades
of the ADA, the Supreme Court heard eighteen related cases. 19 None
GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUG·
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983), with TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (forthcoming Nov.
2010), and Kenneth Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before
Brown, r IS YALE L.]. 2S6 (2oos).
17 We note, as well, the absence of disability rights cause lawyers from the general cause lawyering literature. See CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., I998) [hereinafter POLITICAL COMMITMENTS]; CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat &
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004); THE WORLDS
CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 200S) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND AGENCY]; see also THE CULTURAL
LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2008). In this collection,
there is only one contribution on cause lawyering for the disabled: Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers,
Clients, and the State: Congress as a Forum for Cause Lawyering During the Enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA,
supra at 2 I I. The one monograph on this topic deals with an earlier (pre-ADA) point in time.
See SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED
PERSONS (I984).
18 Several definitions have been offered in the literature, with a key distinction being the dividing line between "cause lawyers" and "lawyers for causes." See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHTs (2008); accord William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing
Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, I06 YALE L.}. I623,
I632 (I997); see also Scott Barclay & Anna-Maria Marshall, Supporting a Cause, Developing a
Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in
Vermont, in STRUCTURE AND AGENCY, supra note I 7, at I 7 I, I 74 ("The definition of cause lawyering is broad, encompassing a variety of tactics and strategies and emphasizing the transformative goals and motivations of the attorneys engaged in the work.').
19 See United States v. Georgia, S46 U.S. IS I (2006); Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,
S4S U.S. II9 (2oos); Tennessee v. Lane, 54 I U.S. S09 (2004); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs.,
P.C. v. Wells, S38 U.S. 440 (2003); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, S40 U.S. 44 (2003); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Echazabal, S36 U.S. 73 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, S3S U.S. 39I (2002); Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, S34 U.S. I84 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, S32 U.S. 66I
(200I); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, S3I U.S. 3S6 (200I); Olmstead v. L.C., S27 U.S.
S8I (I999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, S27 U.S. SSS (I999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., S27 U.S. sr6 (I999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., S27 U.S. 47I (I999); Cleveland v. Policy
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of the lawyers who filed these actions that have been litigated in the
Supreme Court met this standard. Instead, these cases generally have
been initiated by lawyers with limited civil rights experience, let alone
experience with, and connection to, the broader disability rights
movement. To the extent that cause lawyers for the disability rights
community have been involved, they appear as amici or, more recently,
as intervenors seeking creative ways to ensure that ADA cases that
have already been filed by traditional tort lawyers are not decided by
the Justices on the merits.
Given the prominent role that cause lawyers have played in prior
civil rights movements, the fact that committed and engaged disability
rights advocates have had almost no role in selecting or structuring the
Supreme Court's ADA agenda is surprising. It has also, we submit,
left the movement vulnerable to just the kind of exploitation of its internal contradictions that Bagenstos describes. By carefully - or, as
some have argued, ruthlessly - pushing only those cases that advanced a particular interpretation of the movement's objectives, cause
lawyers such as Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall
played a key role in making sure that their respective movements presented a unified and cohesive face to courts and the general public.
The absence of any similar disciplining force in the ADA arena has left
the articulation of the movement's message to the choices of individual
litigants and their lawyers - parties that often have little or no interest in presenting anything other than an interpretation of the statute
and its reach that serves their own highly particularized interests. The
result has been a series of Supreme Court cases attempting to stretch
the ADA's coverage to novel, and often highly unusual and unpopular,
circumstances. Not surprisingly, these claims rarely succeed.
The ADA Supreme Court cases contrast sharply with those that
cause lawyers for persons with disabilities have been actively pursuing
under the ADA. Rather than focusing on Court cases as their predecessors in other movements have done, these lawyers have focused
their efforts on bringing suit with an eye toward settlement or district
court victories on the relatively clear parts of the statute relating
to access to areas of public accommodation. Their claims commonly
represent a core set of ideas and commitments that members of the
disability rights community broadly support. In bringing these kinds
of cases, the movement's lawyers have sought to improve the daily
lived experiences of their clients and also to stake out rights via settlements that extend to the larger American disability community.

Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).

2010]

CAUSE LAWYERING

As these successes demonstrate, with the aid of the kind of careful
deliberation about means and ends that committed and informed cause
lawyers bring to their work, the disability rights movement can make
important progress on its traditional rights- based antidiscrimination
agenda despite the many internal contradictions Bagenstos identifies.
Yet these same lawyers have played no similar role in crafting the
ADA cases that have ended up before the Court.
In the balance of this Review, we begin to explore why disability
rights cause lawyers have largely chosen not to pursue the kind of Supreme Court litigation strategy followed by their predecessors - and
even contemporaries - in other civil rights movements and why they
should reconsider this strategy in light of Bagenstos's important critique. Unlike other social movements, disability rights lawyers since
1990 have had something that other civil rights groups are still searching for: a federal statute that not only purports to protect disabled
Americans from express discrimination, but also requires employers
and others to provide "reasonable accommodations" to ensure this
group's full participation in society. 20 This circumstance reflects the
historical context of disability cause lawyers. Operating in the aftermath of the civil rights movement, these advocates were able to lobby
Congress successfully to pass a disability rights statute. At the same
time, however, Congress promulgated imprecise statutory language
that ultimately was susceptible to limiting judicial interpretation. It is
not surprising, therefore, that these advocates have concentrated their
efforts on enforcing these provisions in the lower federal courts. This
is particularly true in light of the Justice Department's general ambivalence, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, toward actively enforcing even the Act's basic provisions during most of
this period (p. 125) and a growing skepticism by many progressives
about the Supreme Court's ability to effect social changeY
These and other similar reasons provide strong justification for disability rights cause lawyers to pursue a different path than the one
that Charles Hamilton Houston and other traditional cause lawyers
opted for in the past. They do not, however, counsel in favor of abandoning Supreme Court litigation altogether as the cause lawyers in this
area seem to have done, let alone creating a significant shift away from
the entire antidiscrimination paradigm. Although many of the problems faced by Americans with disabilities would undoubtedly be improved by the passage of comprehensive social welfare programs such
20 As Bagenstos discusses and others have recounted in more detail, cause lawyers were instrumental in getting the ADA passed. See Ziv, supra note 17.
2! For a treatment of the difference in public enforcement between 1960s civil rights statutes
and the ADA, see Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REv.
434, 45<)-60 (2007).
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as universal healthcare and comprehensive vocational training, the
fact that these wholesale reforms have proven so politically daunting
should caution disability rights advocates against directing all of their
efforts toward achieving this important, but frustratingly elusive, goal.
Instead, we urge these committed cause lawyers to pursue a multilayered strategy that seeks to combine advocacy for broad-based programs of the kind Bagenstos proposes with a carefully tailored litigation strategy. This strategy should be designed to present the Supreme
Court with an appropriate - and appropriately compelling - case to
elaborate some of the key elements of the ADA that have still received
relatively little judicial attention notwithstanding the array of cases
that the Court has already decided. Although such a strategy cannot
guarantee that the Court will take whatever case these cause lawyers
decide to pursue - let alone decide it in their favor - it would help
to create a dialogue about the goals and priorities of the disability
rights movement that could allow it to move forward despite its internal contradictions.
The rest of this Review proceeds in four parts. Part II summarizes
Bagenstos's argument about the tensions within the disability rights
movement and describes his assessment of how these conflicts have
played a key role in undermining the movement's effectiveness, particularly in the Supreme Court. Part ill documents the surprising absence of disability rights cause lawyers from Supreme Court ADA
cases. It then provides a portrait of these disability rights movement
attorneys. Next, Part ill examines the cases that disability rights
cause lawyers have been bringing under the Act. These cases appear
not to raise, or at least to elide, the contradictory shoals that Bagenstos
argues have undermined the efforts of those interested in disability
rights in the Court. Part IV then explains why these lawyers have
pursued a strategy that places very little emphasis on the Court, noting
that despite this strategy's broad success, it also has negatively impacted the ADA's antidiscrimination agenda. Part V suggests that recent events - including Bagenstos's appointment to head the Justice
Department's efforts in this area- signal that the time has come for
disability rights cause lawyers strategically to reengage Supreme Court
litigation and provides some tentative suggestions for how these advocates might do so in a way that could help resolve the contradictions
Bagenstos describes. Part VI concludes.
II. LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS
Analyzing Supreme Court ADA jurisprudence, Law and Contradictions maintains that the Court's decisions can be understood as aligning with one of a myriad of different advocacy positions advanced by
the pluralistic disability rights movement. For example, Bagenstos argues that the "Court's definition-of-disability decisions are in many
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ways quite consistent with the 'independence' frame many disability
rights advocates employed in arguing for the ADA in the late I98os"
(p. 39). Likewise, he argues that those decisions are "also consistent
with an understanding of disability as defining a discrete, stigmatized
minority group. Indeed, it would be hard to come up with a pattern of
decisions that fit that understanding better than the bottom lines the
Court has actually reached" (p. 4I).22
Hence, the account by some advocates that judicial backlash
against the ADA has impeded the statute's efficacy is "vastly overstated" (p. 2). Similarly, Bagenstos suggests that contrary to the backlash account, the post-ADA lack of increase in relative employment of
persons with disabilities is caused by "inherent limitations of antidiscrimination laws" (and especially the reasonable accommodation
mandate) in eviscerating deeply entrenched social stigmas and their attendant barriers (p. 2). In consequence, maximizing the salutary impact of the ADA requires "confronting the tensions within disability
rights thinking" and developing a coherent approach, rather than
"simply criticizing" judicial opinions (p. I I). Bagenstos focuses on the
strength and limits of the antidiscrimination agenda as one of the key
issues on which clarity and consensus are crucial to fostering deeper
legal and political engagement (p. u). Law and Contradictions suggests that these tensions arise from the diverse constituents of the
movement, disagreement over the breadth of ADA coverage, and conflict over what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
It bears noting that in aligning Court holdings with strains of disability rights thinking, Law and Contradictions does not restrict itself to
arguments posed by lawyers in these cases. Instead, Bagenstos compares the Court's reasoning to pre-ADA advocacy, a time when groups
of individuals with distinct disabilities pursued advocacy that forwarded the interests of only individuals with similar disabilities. More
generally, Law and Contradictions derives themes and tensions of the
disability rights movement from a broad array of sources and scholarship that range beyond the Court's cases (pp. I2-33). And although
the Court's opinions can be squared with one strand of disability
rights thinking or another, Bagenstos does not contend that those
strands were developed by cause lawyers.
By way of background, Law and Contradictions describes the evolution of the concept of "disability" from individual disability-specific
movements to a pan-disability movement, beginning in the I 970s.
Prominent in this transformation were the rise of the Independent Living Movement (pp. I4-I6), the ideologically harmonious deinstitutionalization movement of self-advocates (pp. I6-I8), and parent-driven
22

A footnote has been omitted.
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efforts toward inclusive education (p. 17). The r98os saw the rise of
AIDS activists and the merging of the culturally Deaf into the larger
disability movement (pp. r7-r8). Uniting these disparate advocacy
strands together by providing a common focal point about which all
can agree is the social model of disability. The social model views the
socially constructed environment as causing disability. This model is
in contrast to a medical model that deems disability an inherent and
limiting characteristic. Since disabling conditions are artificial and
remedial, disability rights advocates likened their circumstance to that
of other historically excluded minority groups and advocated for similar civil rights-type remedies (pp. r8-2o). Yet despite coherence
among disparate disability rights groups over adoption of the social
model as a general mantra, Law and Contradictions identifies three
considerable tensions within the collective enterprise. The first philosophical tension is between those who see disability as universal and
those who conceive of the disability category as a discrete minority
(pp. 2o-2 r). The second "unacknowledged" tension in worldview arises between disability rights advocates who feel disability professionals are paternalistic and oppressive and activists who rely upon the
skills and assistance of those experts (pp. 2 r -2 2). The third and most
significant tension revolves around independence (pp. 22-33). Although every segment of the collective disability rights movement aspires to independence (and related notions of autonomy and dignity),
these segments conflict over the meaning and extent of that notion.
While persons with disabilities wish to live on their own and on their
own terms, they often find themselves reliant on public assistance for
the means through which to achieve this agency. Thus, there exists a
deep divide within the movement as to the desirability of welfare in
the pursuit of social equality. Each of these tensions is addressed in
turn.
Having identified the extent of the disability category to be protected under the ADA as controversial within the disability rights
community, Law and Contradictions discusses pertinent Supreme
Court opinions that limit the scope of statutory protection. These rulings have held that the scope of disability coverage is to be narrowly
defined, confined to those conditions that seriously limit individuals'
ability to perform major life activities, prevent employees with disabilities from engaging in a range of related work activities, continue to
present such barriers even in their mitigated (namely, post-medicated)
states, or involve more than mere imputation of stereotypes (pp. 3540). Contrary to prevailing wholesale criticisms of these opinions, Law
and Contradictions maintains that they are consistent with key elements of disability rights advocacy that concentrate on individuals
whose disabilities are beyond question and who want to enter the
workplace to gain independence from public benefits or who experience stigma and subordination (pp. 41-44). Thus, the exclusion from
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ADA coverage of already employed individuals with near-sightedness,
high blood pressure, and carpal tunnel syndrome - economically empowered people whose disabilities exist at the fringe of the categoryis on a level with beliefs deeply held by elements of the disability
movement who embrace independence and minority models of disability. To achieve an opposite approach, that of universal coverage, requires a political solution (pp. 53-54).
The second inherent tension among disability rights advocates
highlighted by Law and Contradictions involves divergent perspectives
toward disability experts. Some movement members abhor these individuals for the historical paternalism and control they have imposed
on the disability community, while others view experts as instrumentally valuable, if not allies, in achieving goals. Because much of disability discrimination, according to Law and Contradictions, arises from
safety fears - say, the person with a disability is thought contagious,
or in danger of falling in harm's way-- courts rely upon the judgment
of public health officials in assessing risk (pp. 76-82 ). The Court's
ADA cases in which persons with disabilities were excluded from
workplace opportunities based on professional assessments of the risks
those plaintiffs allegedly posed exemplify to one part of the disability
rights community the paternalistic politics underlying "neutral" evaluations (pp. 82-94). By contrast, another segment of the disability
movement deems protection of fetuses and infants with disabilities and
prohibitions on assisted suicide necessary safeguards against social
mores that undervalue the quality of life and contributions of people
with disabilities (pp. 95-I I I). Without taking sides in this matter, although it expresses sympathy for an alternative that favors autonomy
(p. IJ4), Law and Contradictions notes tensions even within these
drawn lines.
It is in discussing the third tension amongst disability rights advocates, concerning the meaning of independence and the vehicles necessary to achieve equality, that Law and Contradictions addresses the future of American disability law. At the heart of the matter is a
philosophical gulf between disability rights advocates on their views of
what constitutes independence and the role that antidiscrimination
norms can play in achieving that goal. In the course of citing (pp.
u6-I9) and questioning (pp. II9-28) the bleak statistics on the relative post-ADA employment rate of people with disabilities, Law and
Contradictions contends that the antidiscrimination agenda may even
contribute to socioeconomic disparities because, despite its promise, it
cannot by itself unseat deeply entrenched social stigmas (pp. I I8-2o).
Instead, the future of disability law lies in a combination of increased
governmental enforcement of existing rights (pp. I32-35), expansion of
public health insurance in a manner that would allow more people
with disabilities to work without losing access to health care (pp. IJ842), and greater consumer control of disability benefits (pp. I4I-45).
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Deciding how to balance these considerations as part of a unified political effort is an unresolved but crucial issue for the pluralistic disability rights movement.

III. THE NONTRADITIONAL ROLE OF
DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS

Civil rights movements have always had lawyers bringing cases to
challenge exclusionary social power structuresP Across these predecessor movements, cause lawyers have boldly pursued systemic litigation.24 At times, the attorneys have even placed the movement's
broader objectives ahead of their individual clients' particular interests
in order to take opportune cases to the Supreme Court. 25 Below, we
will demonstrate how the disability movement has what can and
should be considered "disability cause lawyers," although they have
operated in somewhat nontraditional ways. Contrary to predecessor
movements, the most visible disability rights cases - those receiving
Supreme Court adjudication - are notable for the absence of cause
lawyers.
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish the cause lawyers
we are discussing from the "advocates" Bagenstos describes in Law
and Contradictions. Part of Bagenstos's significant contribution to the
disability rights literature is to explain the role of advocates and activists in the creation of a modern disability movement. The relationship
between politicians, social advocates, and lawyers in developing social
movem'ents is a complex one that goes beyond the scope of this Review. Rather, we confine our focus to cause lawyers and exploring
their place in the pluralism of the disability rights movement. Cause
."

See Austin 'sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in POLITICAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 17, at 3, 4
("Cause lawyering ... is frequently directed at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and
political status quo.'); Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, The Dynamics of Cause Lawyering: Constraints and Opportunities, in STRUCTURE AND AGENCY, supra note 17, at 1, 9 ("[Cause lawyers] work with, and against, prevailing conceptions of how legal practices can and should be organized ... .').
24 See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING To BELIEVE IN:
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004).
25 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High
Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENV. U. L REV. 457, 489 (2009) ("With regard to the NAACP's
legal campaign to end segregated schools, lawyers pursued a campaign of litigation ... in the
manner the lawyers thought best for the broader cause of desegregation ... even where doing so
may have been in tension with the individual interests of the clients being represented in a particular suit.'); Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 1633-34 ("Marshall and the other covenant attorneys"
when litigating the Shelley case saw the decision whether to pursue certiorari "as a legal tactical
question about getting the 'right' case to the Court at the 'right' time. In their view, such questions would not be ceded to the clients, who were merely placeholders in their campaign, but
would be decided by lawyers.").
23
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lawyers, as we use the term, have a more specific role than shaping a
movement, or at least a more specific set of tools at their disposal in
doing so. They can craft litigation - or use the threat of litigation on behalf of a cause and exert a measure of influence over how the
work of courts can influence the internal and external perceptions of a
movement. Our analysis also tracks that of Law and Contradictions
by looking exclusively at ADA claims. Although other federal statutes
protecting the rights of people with disabilities have been litigated
both before and after 1990,Z 6 the ADA represents the most comprehensive domestic legal and policy statement on the rights of people with
disabilities 27 and is therefore the focus of study.
Section ill.A provides an empirical view into the identity and professional expertise of those lawyers who argued the eighteen Supreme
Court ADA cases. It then evaluates the consequences of the unique
circumstance that none of those attorneys was a cause lawyer on behalf of the group they were representing before the Court. Thrning to
the disability cause lawyers, section ill.B describes those individuals
and section III.C offers a snapshot of the types of cases they bring.

A. Supreme Court Litigation
The Supreme Court has thus far heard eighteen Americans with
Disabilities Act cases. 28 Each case involved an individual plaintiff asserting an individual claim under the statute, and involved rights that
are fundamental to the ADA's central mission of integrating people
with disabilities into society. These assertions include claims for community-based treatment options,Z 9 freedom from workplace discrimi-

26 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 140o-1482 (2006) (addressing
discrimination in education), the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(2006) (addressing discrimination in housing), the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, id.
§§ 1997-1997j (protecting people in institutions), and the Medicaid Act, id. §§ 1396a(a)-1396v, are
others.
27 See Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1068
(July 26, 1990) ("This historic act is the world's first comprehensive declaration of equality for
people with disabilities [and] has made the United States the international leader on this human
rights issue.''). A more international and holistic approach to disability rights is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61!Io6, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007). For an assessment comparing this approach to United States federal law, see MICHAEL STEIN & MICHAEL WATERSTONE, NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
FINDING THE GAPS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (CRPD) (2008}, available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publicationsl2oo8/pdf/
ncd_crpd_analysis.pdf.
28 See cases cited supra note 19.
29 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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nation, 30 equal access to dental care, 31 and nondiscrimination in an
athletic tournament, 32 amongst others.
Yet none of these eighteen Supreme Court cases was initiated or
argued by lawyers who spend a significant part of their professional
time on disability rights cases or have a formal connection to a disability rights organization. The initiating attorneys ranged from general
employment lawyers to solo practitioners handling a wide portfolio of
cases (personal injury, trusts and wills, and so forth) but without significant civil rights experience, to large-firm practitioners who normally focus on transactional litigation. In one instance, Bragdon v. Abbott,33 suit was initiated by the Boston office of Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders, 34 which is a cause lawyering organization,
but not one centered on disability advocacy. Table 1 demonstrates the
practice experience of the lawyers involved at the district court level
with each of the cases eventually heard by the Supreme Court during
the period of the ADA's existence.
Academics have recently begun to explore the role of the elite and
specialized appellate and Supreme Court bar. 35 As would be expected,
as the eighteen cases eventually heard by the Court ascended through
the federal system, some of the lawyers changed. In some instances,
lawyers with experience in appellate and Supreme Court litigation entered the picture on the plaintiffs' side. Yet generally speaking, these
lawyers at the Supreme Court stage still fell short of "elite" Supreme
Court status - those attorneys who are brought in to argue significant
cases. 36 In several instances, the lawyers who argued for the disability

30 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391 (2002); Toyota Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
31 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
32 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
33 524 U.S. 624.
34 See Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Our Work Bragdon v. Abbott,
http://www.glad.org/worklcases/bragdon-v-abbott (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
35 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).
36 Professor Lazarus suggests that a "measure of an expert Supreme Court advocate is someone who has ... presented at least five oral arguments before the Court or works with a law firm
or other organization with attorneys who in the aggregate have presented a total of at least ten
arguments before the Court." /d. at 1490 n.17. By this standard, using the same data set as set
forth below, infra note 37, only 27% of the lawyers who argued at the Supreme Court for the
ADA claimant would be considered "expert counsel." When the government lawyers (who by nature of their job have significant experience before the Supreme Court) are removed from consideration, the number is only 8%. Of the nongovernmental Supreme Court advocates, almost twothirds were making their first Supreme Court argument in their ADA case. For over half, their
ADA Supreme Court case is their only Supreme Court case thus far in their respective careers.
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TABLE I. LAWYERS AT DISTRICT COURT LEVEL FOR EACH
SUPREME COURT CASE -PRACTICE EXPERIENCE
FROM 1990 TO CASE FILING 3 7
CASE

United States v. Georgia
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd.
Tennessee v. Lane
Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs. P.C. v. Wells
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams
PGA Tour Inc. v. Martin
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett
Olmstead v. L.C.
Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc.

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

(none)
Torts/Negligence: 6.52%
Civil Rights: 4.35%
Torts/Negligence: 4.5 5%
Civil Rights: 13.64%
Torts/Negligence: 2o.oo%
Civil Rights: 24.20%
Civil Rights: 5o.oo%
Torts/Negligence: 33.33%
Civil Rights: 40.oo%
(none)
Torts/Negligence: 2 2. 2 2%
Disability Discrimination: 14.10%
Civil Rights: 2_9.50%
(none)
Torts/Negligence: 12.59%
Civil Rights: .'i4.oz%
Disability Discrimination: 8.33%
Torts/Negligence: 8.33%
Civil Rights: 33.33%

37 Our methodology for Tables 1 and 2 was as follows: For each of the ADA Supreme Court
cases, see supra note 19, at the district, appellate, certiorari, and Supreme Court stages, we recorded the case number, case title, filing date, court, and lawyers. For the district and appellate
stages, the inclusion criterion for lawyers was appearance on the docket. Dockets were obtained
through Westlaw and PACER. At the certiorari stage, lawyers were included if listed on the brief
for the ADA claimant, whether petitioner or respondent. At the Supreme Court level, lawyers
were included if listed within the decision's syllabus. We t!Ien collected two sets of data on each
lawyer's litigation history through Westlaw Profiler's Litigation History Reports. The first set
captured data between 1990 (the passage of the ADA) and the year prior to the case filing date.
The second set captured data between 1990 and 2009. We captured data including, but not limited to: total cases, primary and secondary practice areas, civil rights, torts and negligence, disability discrimination, employment and labor, housing, public accommodation, and Supreme Court
experience. Because the availability of Westlaw's Litigation History Reports depends on voluntary inclusion, there are certain lawyers for whom information was not available. Most notably,
information was not available for Bennett Klein - who, from district to Supreme Court, argued
Bragdon- or at the appellate stage for Murphy. Thus, our sample was drawn from a total of 26
out of 30 (86.7%) lawyers at the district court, 22 out of 24 (91.7%) lawyers at the appellate level,
37 out of 40 (92.5%) lawyers at the certiorari stage, and 33 out of 34 (97.1%) lawyers at the Supreme Court leveL Overall, we were able to capture u8 out of 128 lawyers, or 92.2% of t!Ie population.
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Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys.
Corp.
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv.
Corp.
Bragdon v. Abbott
Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey
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Torts/Negligence: 7.69%
Civil Ri_g_hts: _.1.8_i%
Torts/Negligence: 14.29%
Civil Rights: 12 .so%
Public Accommodation: 4· 76%
Housing: 4· 76%
Civil Rights: 33.33%
Civil Rights: 16.67%

rights claimants were making their first appearance before the Court. 38
The Supreme Court lawyers were also not consistently what we would
classify as disability cause lawyers. In two cases, the lawyers who argued before the Court had significant experience in disability law or
civil rights cases and some connection to disability organizations. 39
But these instances were an exception to the rule, with most lawyers
appearing before the Court lacking expertise and connection to the
disability rights community. Table 2 demonstrates the civil rights experience of the lawyers involved at the Supreme Court level with each
of the cases that went up to the Supreme Court over the course of the
ADA's enactment.
The complete absence of disability cause lawyers from the list of
those initiating ADA cases eventually heard by the Court, as well as
their limited role at the appellate level, clearly diverges from predecessor social movements in which key cases traditionally have been initiated and litigated by cause lawyers. As indicated above, the litigation leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education 40 was almost exclusively controlled by cause lawyers. 41
Even after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, cause lawyers
have continued to play a significant role in the cases that have come

38 This observation is empirical rather than editorial. For a discussion of first-time arguers
before the Supreme Court, see Christine M. Macey, Referral Is Not Required: How Inexperienced
Supreme Court Advocates Can Fulfill Their Ethical Obligations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 979

(2009).

39 Claudia Center, a lawyer with the Employment Law Center in San Francisco with extensive experience in disability cases, argued the plaintiff's case before the Supreme Court in US
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Bagenstos, who had extensive civil rights experience but no formal connection to the disability rights movement, argued the plaintiff's case in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); and
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
40 347

u.s. 483 (1954).

See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT 127 (1994) (describing a lawyers' conference organized by Marshall to
determine future litigation toward school desegregation and the resulting approaches adopted).
41
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TABLE 2. PRACTICE EXPERIENCE OF LAWYERS AT
SUPREME COURT FROM 1990 TO CASE FILING
CASE

United States v. Georgia

Spector v. Norwegian Cruise
Line Ltd.

Tennessee v. Lane

Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells

Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc.
v. Williams
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin

Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett
Olmstead v. L.C.

Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

ADA Employment: 0.17%
Disability Discrimination: 0.2 I%
Civil Rights: o.84%
Public Accommodation: o.63%
Housing: 0.99%
ADA Employment: 0.36%
Disability Discrimination: 0.36%
Torts/Negligence: 45 -43%
Civil Rights: 4.66%
ADA Empioyment: I .4 7%
Disability Discrimination: 5 .88%
Torts/Negligence: 1.47%
Civil Rights: 4-4I%
Housing: 1.25%
ADA Employment: 1.88%
Disability Discrimination: I .88%
Torts/Negligence: I3.I3%
Civil Rights: I6.88%
Disability Discrimination: I5.63%
Civil Rights: 9.38%
ADA Employment: I 2.90%
Disability Discrimination: 6-45%
Torts/Negligence: 3.23%
Civil Rights: 45.I6%
Disability Discrimination: 33.33%
Civil Rights: 25.oo%
Disability Discrimination: 28.57%
Civil Rights: 7.14%
Public Accommodation: 1.92%
Torts/Negligence: 17.3I%
Civil Rights: 17.3I%
Torts/Negligence: I6. 70%
Civil Rights: I 1.10%
Disability Discrimination: 5.I3%
Torts/Negligence: 5.I3%
Civil Rights: 20.5I%
ADA Employment: 1.72%
Disability Discrimination: 6.90%
Torts/Negligence: I3.79%
Civil Rights: 13.79%
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Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc.
Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt.
Sys. Corp.
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv.
Corp.
Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey

Disability Discrimination: 8. 70%
Civil Rights: 4·35%
Disability Discrimination: 3.5 7%
Civil Rights: P4%
Disability Discrimination: 8.33%
Torts/Negligence: 16.67%
Civil Rights: 12.50%
Civil Rights: 2o.oo%
Torts/Negligence: 1.56%
Civil Rights: 20.31%

before the Court. The attorneys in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 42 a fundamental Title VII case, were all established civil rights litigators with
connections to the NAACP from the district court level upward. 43
Another seminal Title VII case, International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 44 featured an alliance of women's rights, labor rights,
and workplace safety activists, all of whom were deeply involved in
the case from the earliest stages. 45 Bowers v. Hardwick, 46 a prominent
sexual orientation rights case, was brought after the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) offered to represent Michael Hardwick and
use his circumstances to challenge the constitutionality of anti-sodomy

42 40I U.S. 424 (I97I) (holding that facially neutral practices, procedures, or tests that are discriminatory in effect cannot be used to preserve the status quo of employment discrimination).
43 The earliest recorded opinion in the case shows J. LeVonne Chambers and Conrad 0. Pearson as counsel for the plaintiff. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244 (M.D.N.C.
I968). Chambers was a civil rights litigator (now law professor) who had previously worked for
the NAACP. See JULIUS L. CHAMBERS PAPERS, I902-I989 (Univ. of N.C. at Charlotte I996),
available at http://dlib.uncc.edu/special_collections/manuscripts/html/85.php. Pearson had been
one of the lawyers in Hocutt v. Wilson, Civ. No. I-I88 (N.C. Super. Ct., Mar. 28, I933), one of the
first challenges to segregation in higher education. At the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court,
Jack Greenberg, the director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund who argued Brown v.
Board of Education, was the lead lawyer for plaintiffs. See Griggs, 40I U.S. 424, 425 (I97I);
Griggs, 420 F.2d I225, I227 (4th Cir. I970).
44 499 U.S. I87 (I99I). Johnson Controls applied the "bona fide occupational qualification"
defense to a company's policy of excluding fertile women, but not men, from the workplace. /d.
at 200.
45 See Caroline Bettinger-L6pez & Susan Sturm, International Union, U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls: The History of Litigation Alliances and Mobilization To Challenge Fetal Protection Policies,
in MYRIAM E. GILLES & RlSA L. GOLUBOFF, CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 2 I I, 2 IJ (2008) ("[Johnson Controls] illustrates the impact of relationships among repeat players in the legal advocacy
community, particularly the strong relationships between labor attorneys in the UAW and feminist
attorneys in national women's rights organizations.'). The United Auto Workers filed the complaint in Johnson Controls with the plan that it would be a "test case, a policy case" that could
eventually go to the Supreme Court. See id. at 228 (citing JULIANA S. GONEN, LITIGATION AS
LOBBYING 58 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 4 78 U.S. I86 (I986).
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laws. 47 Even in cases where those promoting the interests of minorities have been on the defendant's side, the lawyers involved have
tended to possess significant civil rights experience. In the University
of Michigan affirmative action cases, 48 for example, the university was
represented by John Payton, a lawyer with substantial experience with
and connection to the black civil rights movement. Mr. Payton is now
the Director Counsel of the Legal Defense Fund. 49 It is clear that in
other social movements, experienced lawyers with connections to civil
rights organizations were involved in key cases from the beginning. 50
Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to state that cause lawyers have had no involvement in Supreme Court disability cases. Rather than initiating, directing, and arguing the cases, cause lawyers
have two roles. The most visible example is that in nearly every Supreme Court case, disability rights organizations filed amicus briefs at
the appellate and Supreme Court level. This role has grown over time.
In Bragdon, the first ADA Supreme Court case, disability organizations coordinated on one main amicus brief. 51 In Goodman v. Georgia,52 the most recent ADA Supreme Court case (and the only one
heard so far by the Roberts Court), the five amicus briefs reflected a
broader cross-section of the disability advocacy community and were
more strategic in nature. 53 Cause lawyers have consistently used amicus briefs as a tool in Supreme Court cases in all other civil rights
areas. 54
47 See William H. Eskridge, Jr., The Crime Against Nature on Trial: Bowers v. Hardwick,
1986, in GILLES & GOLUBOFF, supra note 45, at 156.
48 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
49 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47 How. L.J.
499, 533-34 (2004)50 For a detailed description of the actions of a prime protagonist, see TUSHNET, supra note

41.
51 See Brief of the AIDS Action Council et a!. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (I998) (No. 97-IS6), I998 WL 47252.
5 2 546 u.s. IS I (2006).
53 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Disability Rights Network in Support of Petitioners,
Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, 04-I236), 2005 WL I8uo6o; Brief for ADAPT eta!. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, o4-I236), 2005 WL
I8uo6I; Brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation eta!. in Support of Petitioners,
Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, 04-I236), 2005 WL I8I2485; Brief of the Honorable Dick
Thornburgh and the National Organization on Disability as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, 04-I236), 2005 WL I8263I7. In Goodman, many of
these briefs were written by cause lawyers. So, for example, the lawyers who wrote the Goodman
amicus brief for Dick Thornburgh and the National Organization on Disability included Arlene
Mayerson (Director, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund), Eve Hill (then-Director, Disability Rights Legal Center), and academics Peter Blanck (Chairman, Burton Blatt Institute) and
Michael Waterstone (chair, American Association of Law Schools's Section on Disability Law).
54 See Bettinger-L6pez & Sturm, supra note 45; see also CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS
ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES
I63--67 (I9S9) (describing the NAACP's strategy of using amici curiae briefs in restrictive cove-
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Another important but less noticed contribution by disability rights
cause lawyers involves their efforts to prevent cases from being heard
by the Court.55 Many disability rights advocates feel that a conservative Rehnquist Court had weakened the ADA by handing down damaging precedents,56 and especially so in cases with marginal fact patterns_57 Consequently, some long-time disability cause lawyers have
urged withdrawal or settlement of ADA cases granted certiorari, 58 with

nant cases before the U.S. Supreme Court); STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 219-35 (1995).
55 This strategy is not unique to disability rights lawyers. See, e.g., HANS ]. HACKER, THE
CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION (2005) (discussing the amicus strategies
of Christian Right cause lawyers). For a discussion of progressive groups generally trying to avoid
the Supreme Court or to ensure narrow holdings, see Richard L. Hasen, How Liberals Can Win
by Losing at the Roberts Court, SLATE, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2228257· Of late,
cause lawyers for the gay rights movement have used this strategy with some success. In Smelt v.
County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 447
F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006), a same-sex couple sought a marriage license from the county clerk's office. See Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 864. After suing in federal court to challenge their denial, defendants argued that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the Defense of Marriage Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). On
appeal, cause lawyers for the gay rights movement (Lambda Legal and the National Center for
Lesbian Rights, representing Equality California), intervened, arguing that plaintiffs did not have
standing and should abstain. The intervenors prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, thus evading potential Supreme Court review. See Smelt, 447 F.3d at 686.
56 See Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality
Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2003) [hereinafter Soifer, Disabling the ADA] ("The
Court's recent deconstruction of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides a series of
striking illustrations. In the name of essences that the Justices alone can discern, the Court repeatedly ignores or overrules Congress. It also rejects interpretations painstakingly worked out
by lower court judges. The Court has turned an important civil rights statute into an unseemly
hash." (citations omitted)); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, roo (1999); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the
ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY]. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000); Aviam Soifer,
The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 12991307 (2000) [hereinafter Soifer, The Disability Term] (discussing courts' restrictive interpretation of
the "regarded as" definition).
57 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (upholding the accommodation right
of a disabled professional golfer to use a golf cart rather than walk during a PGA tour); see also
Soifer, Disabling the ADA, supra note 56, at 1301 ("The case [PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin] may be
hard to take entirely seriously. For one thing, it seems so easily confined to its facts: the very unusual circumstance of an extraordinarily talented, dedicated plaintiff who has a clear, rare disability, yet who still does exceptionally well competing in a commercial sports event that actually is
open to anyone willing to pay a hefty entrance fee to enter the competition.").
58 This was true for Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), ultimately a victory for disability
rights plaintiffs, which held that Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity
insofar as it was intended to protect the fundamental right of access to courts. /d. Before Lane,
this proposition was very much open, with advocates fearing that the Supreme Court would do
with Title II what it had done to Title I in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), in which it held under sovereign immunity principles that the entirety of
Title I was not valid section 5 legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The disability rights
advocates who campaigned against having Lane heard did so despite a sympathetic fact pattern:
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a pair of victories. One instance was Hasan v. Medical Board of California,59 where Dr. Hason's application for a medical license was denied on the grounds of his mental illness. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether or not under these circumstances Title II
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. 60 In light of an unsympathetic plaintiff and the Court's opinion in Garrett, 61 California disability rights advocates followed a creative strategy to get the case off
of the Court's docket before it could be heard. The advocates prevailed upon then-Governor of California, Gray Davis, to appoint a
new member of the Medical Board who was supportive of disability
rights. The Board then agreed to reconsider the case and reverse its
decision. At that point, the case was moot and the writ of certiorari
was dismissed. 62
B. Disability Cause Lawyers

Despite its absence from Supreme Court ADA cases, there is a vibrant professional advocacy community around these issues. Disability cause lawyers have actively been enforcing the statute in the lower
federal courts. These lawyers spend significant amounts of time on
disability rights cases, both at the private and public interest levels.
They span the country, although they tend to be focused in the larger
cities, with an emphasis in Washington, D.C. and northern California.
Some of these organizations, such as the National Federation for the
Blind, are primarily designed to serve individuals with a specific disability.63 Others, like the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, serve the
entire disabled population. 64 There also are organizations such as the
Bazelon Center that were developed to serve one sector (for example,
people with mental disabilities), yet over time have expanded their advocacy.65 Still others have a more general civil rights orientation, but
with significant experience in disability cases. The Employment Law
George Lane was compelled to appear in court on the second floor of an inaccessible courthouse
and jailed when he declined to be carried up the stairs. See Lane, 54 I U.S. at 5 I3-I4.
59 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).
60 ld.
61 See Garrett, 53I U.S. 356. Hason preceded Lane, so it is left to conjecture as to how these
advocates would have responded if Lane had already been handed down.
62 Hason, 279 F.3d 1167, cert. dismissed, 538 U.S. 958 (2003). This narrative of events was
based on an interview with Eve Hill, who at the time was the Executive Director of the Disability
Rights Legal Center and was intimately involved in the advocates' efforts. Telephone Interview
with Eve Hill, former Executive Dir., Disability Rights Legal Ctr. (Oct. I, 2009). The second instance was Klingler v. Director, Dep't of Revenue, 366 F.3d 6I4 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S.
I I I I (2005).
63 National Federation of the Blind, http://www.nfb.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
64 Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, http://www.ccdconline.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2010~
65 Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, http://www.bazelon.org/about/
index.htm#history (last visited Mar. 2 7, 20IO).
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Center is one such example. 66 In Table 3, we identify some of the
more engaged public interest organizations and private law firms that
bring a significant number of high-profile disability cases and give
brief details on their geographic locations and targeted practice areas. 67
In addition to these public interest and private firms, the Protection
and Advocacy System (P&A) could be viewed as a species of disability
cause lawyer. 68 P&A is a federally mandated network of organizations
that exists to protect and advance the interests of people with developmental disabilities and has at least one office in every state. 69 Some
offices maintain active litigation agendas, while others do not. 70 The
National Disability Rights Network is the nonprofit membership organization for the P&A. 7 1

66 The Legal Aid Society: Employment Law Center, http://www.las-elc.org/index.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2010).
67 The descriptions of practice areas are taken from the organizations' respective websites.
68 For a discussion of this view, see Gary P. Gross, The Protection and Advocacy System and
Collaboration with Legal Services Programs, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE]., Summer 2001, at 1,
available at http://www.napas.org/aboutus!MIEarticleFinalJO 1 .htm.
69 42 u.s.c. § 15041 (2006).
70 For example, the California offices of Protection and Advocacy have litigated cases involving housing, MediCal (the California version of Medicaid), and services for people with mental
disabilities. See Disability Rights California, Cases, http://pai-ca.org/advocacy/cases.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
71 The P&A network is collectively "the largest provider of legally based advocacy services to
people with disabilities in the United States." National Disability Rights Network, About Us,
http://www.napas.org/aboutus/default.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). Of course, there are several federal agencies tasked with being the "public enforcers" of the ADA. Although the list is long,
the primary agencies with enforcement authority are the Department of Justice and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. For a critique of the enforcement efforts, see Waterstone,
supra note 2 1.
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TABLE 3· ORGANIZATIONS AND PRACTICE AREAS
(A) PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS
ORGANIZATION
Disability Rights
Advocates (DRA)

GEOGRAPHIC
REGION
Berkeley, Cal.

Disability Rights
Education &
Defense Fund

Berkeley, Cal.

Judge David L.
Bazelon Center for
Mental Health
Law

Washington,
D.C.

Disability Rights
Legal Center

Los Angeles,
Cal.

Colorado CrossDisability
Coalition

Denver, Colo.

PRACTICE AREA
A disability-specific non-profit law
firm dedicated to securing the civil
rights of people with disabilities.
DRA advocates for disability rights
through high-impact litigation, as
well as research and education.
A disability-specific organization
whose mission "is to advance the
civil and human rights of people
with disabilities through legal advocacy, training, education, and
public policy and legislative
development."
Mission "is to protect and advance
the rights of adults and children
who have mental disabilities. The
Center envisions an America where
people who have mental illnesses or
developmental disabilities exercise
their own life choices and have
access to the resources that enable
them to participate fully in their
communities."
A disability-specific organization
whose mission "is to promote the
rights of people with disabilities
and the public interest in and
awareness of those rights by providing legal and related services."
This is a cross-disability
organization.
A disability-specific organization
that engages in advocacy to protect
civil rights of all types of people
with disabilities.
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Employment Law
Center (ELC)

San Francisco,
Cal.

The Impact Fund

Berkeley, Cal.

The Public Interest
Law Center of
Philadelphia

Philadelphia,
Pa.
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"[P]romotes the stability of low income and disadvantaged workers
and their families by addressing issues that affect their ability to
achieve self-sufficiency." ELC has
a disability-specific program that
focuses on litigation.
"[P]rovides strategic leadership and
support for litigation to achieve
economic and social justice," ineluding provision of "funds for impact litigation in the areas of civil
rights, environmental justice, and
poverty law." The Impact Fund is
lead counsel in several high-profile
civil rights class action cases.
Uses "public education, continuing
education of [its] clients and client
organizations, research, negotiation
and, when necessary, the courts to
achieve systemic reforms that advance the central goals of selfadvocacy, social justice and equal
protection of the law for all memhers of society."

(B) FOR-PROFIT LAW FIRMS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
ORGANIZATION
Fox & Robertson,
P.C.

Brown, Goldstein
& LevyLLP

GEOGRAPHIC
REGION
Denver, Colo.

Baltimore, Md.

PRACTICE AREA
A civil rights practice with heavy
emphasis on "promoting the rights
of individuals with disabilities to
full enjoyment and equal treatment
in businesses, housing, government
services, transportation and
employment."
General trial lawyers who have a
specialized practice in several highprofile disability cases and offer a
Disability Rights Fellowship to a
recent law graduate with a disability to litigate disability rights cases.
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Goldstein,
Demchak, Baller,
Borgen &
Dardarian
Law Offices of
Matthew W.
Dietz
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Oakland, Cal.

A plaintiff's public interest class
action law firm.

Miami, Fla.

A general civil rights firm with
heavy emphasis on disability rights
cases in employment, public services, and privately owned places of
public accommodation.
A general practitioner with a disability practice, specializing in developmental disabilities, retardation, mental health, physical
disabilities, community services,
and community placement.
Class action lawyers with emphasis
on enforcing civil and consumer
rights.

Law Offices of
David Ferleger

Jenkintown,
Pa.

Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Brayton
Konecky LLP

San Francisco,
Cal.

C. Cases by Disability Cause Lawyers
This section offers a representative snapshot of the work of the various disability cause lawyers and organizations identified above in section III.B. 72 Strikingly apparent is how their work differs in structure

72 As a related matter, we note that in addition to the cause lawyers profiled above, there also
exists a group of lawyers who could potentially be viewed as representing the disability rights
cause. Often referred to as "serial litigators," these lawyers are somewhat controversial for bringing a high volume of cases under the ADA's public accommodations provisions or comparable
state law. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case
of "Abusive" ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2oo6). TYPically, these lawyers bring
access lawsuits against businesses, often filing multiple lawsuits at once, pursuing early settlements, representing the same clients as lead plaintiffs, and initiating their claims with a demand
letter to the challenged business. Many of these lawyers practice in California, where under state
law a plaintiff in access litigation is entitled to damages. See CAL. CIV. CODE§§ 52(a), 54·3 (West
Supp. 2006). These lawyers have been derided by courts and commentators for extorting quick
settlements without pushing for meaningful access improvements and abusing the court system.
See, e.g., Walter Olson, The ADA Shakedown Racket, CITY J., Winter 2004, at So, 82, 83. The
Ninth Circuit has deemed at least one lawyer-client team as vexatious litigants. See Molski v.
Evergreen Dynasty, soo F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). Others assert that these lawyers are challenging legitimate violations of the ADA and state access laws and that their activities are an inevitable result of a statute with broad coverage, a limited remedial scheme, and weak public enforcement. See Bagenstos, supra, at 4-5. We agree with Bagenstos that these lawyers provide a
valuable public service, but we have not included them in our initial analysis because their contributions to the broader movement are tangential to their primary focus of culling income
through damage awards (while also serving the public), rather than advancing the tenets of or
having connection to the larger disability rights community. In addition, the type of suits brought
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and shape from those ADA cases before the Court. Namely, each suit
brought by disability cause lawyers has had broader implications for
systemic change on behalf of people with disabilities than do the cases
before the Court. While some of the cause lawyer cases were brought
pursuant to the class action device, all have had systemic effects
beyond the individuals involved. This circumstance exists in only a
minority of cases brought before the Court by non-cause lawyers.
This phenomenon is especially so in the context of the employment
discrimination claims in which non-cause lawyers request accommodations on behalf of individual clients. 73 This trend might also explain
why so many of the lawyers who chose to practice in this area litigated
cases at the district court level that eventually were heard by the
Court. 74 These cases stand in sharp contrast to the ones that have
been litigated in the Supreme Court.
I. Accessing the Internet: National Federation of the Blind v. Target - A coalition of disability rights advocates brought a class action
suit against Target on behalf of the National Federation of the Blind
and individual plaintiffs. They included a Berkeley-based nonprofit
law firm that specializes in high-impact cases on behalf of people with
disabilities; Brown, Goldstein & Levy, a leading civil rights law firm in
Baltimore that often litigates disability access cases; Schneider & Wallace, a national plaintiffs' class action and civil rights law firm based
in San Francisco; and Peter Blanck, chairman of the Burton Blatt Institute and University Professor at Syracuse University. 75 Under the
settlement reached, Target agreed to make its website fully accessible
and to pay substantial damages. 76
2.
Alternative Forms of Communication in Federal Government
Services: American Council of the Blind v. Astrue. -Represented by
the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) in
Berkeley, California, the American Council of the Blind and ten individual plaintiffs brought a class action case to compel the Social Security Administration to provide information in alternative formats like
Braille, audio, large font, and electronic text to ensure that persons

by these attorneys is highly unlikely to merit review at the Supreme Court, even as they garner
negative attention through the media.
73 See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Dispamte Impact, and Ckl.ss
Actions, 56 DUKE L.]. 861 (2006).
74 See Table 1, supra pp. 1671-72.
75 See Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d u8s (N.D. Cal. 2007); Nat'!
Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
76 Class Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, s, Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 582 F. Supp. 2d
1185 (No. C o6-o1802 MHP), available at http://www.dralegal.org/downloads/casesltarget/FinalAgreement.pdf.
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with visual disabilities can obtain benefits. 77 This case proceeded to a
bench trial, and on October 20, 2009, the court issued a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff classes. 78 This case is one of several in which
DREDF has sued federal government agencies and is not the first
against the Social Security Administration. 79
J. Physical Accessibility in Fast Food Restaurants: Moeller v. Taco
Bell. - Plaintiffs with mobility impairments filed suit against Taco
Bell, challenging physical accessibility barriers at California Taco Bell
stores. 8° Fox & Robertson, a private two-lawyer civil rights law firm
in Denver with a specialization in disability law, brought this class action along with the Impact Fund, a general public interest firm with
an emphasis in high-profile class actions. 81 Fox & Robertson is bringing other cases challenging physical accessibility in the fast food industry82 and other sectors. 83
4· Alternative Communication in Banking: Talking ATM Cases. Over the last several years, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen &
Dardarian, a civil rights firm in Oakland, California, has, together
with solo practitioner Lainey Feingold, engaged in "structured negotiations" with a number of major banks on the part of the California
Council for the Blind, as well as individuals and several other affiliates
of the American Council of the Blind. 84 Collectively, these cause lawyers have negotiated agreements with Bank of America, Bank
One/Chase, and Wells Fargo, among others, "to guarantee that persons
with visual impairments have access to basic banking services that the
sighted world takes for granted," including "talking ATMs" offering
audible instructions to aid customers in their banking transactions. 85

77 See Am. Council of the Blind v. Astrue, No. C 05-o4696 WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. II, 2oo8),
available at http://www.dredf.org/cases/SSA_Ciass_Cert_Order_9-l 2-o8.pdf (order certifying
class).
78 See Am. Council of the Blind v. Astrue, No. c os-04696 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009) (judgment). The plaintiff class won the right to receive communications in a format that is accessible
to them.
79 See Disability Rights Educ. & Def. Fund, State and Federal Programs, http://
www.dredf.org/programs/State_and_Federal.shtrnl (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
80 See Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., No. Co2-05849 MJJ, 2007 WL 2301778, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 8, 2007).
81 /d. at *1.
82 See Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
83 See Pleadings: Fox & Robertson, P.C., http://www.foxrob.com/pleadings.asp (last visited
Mar. 27, 2010).
84 See Goldstein Demchak Baller Borgen & Dardarian, Bank One/Chase Talking ATMs, Web
Access & Alternative Formats, http://www.gdblegal.com/cases/current_cases/Disability_Rights/
BANK_ONE_CHASE.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
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Because of their industry-wide approach, these agreements have
reached tens of thousands of banking locations across the country. 86
5· Discrimination in Voting: American Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Shelley. - The Disability Rights Education and Defense
Fund, based in Berkeley, California, and the Disability Rights Legal
Center, based in Los Angeles, California, represented registered voters
with either visual or manual impairments in opposing the withdrawal
of direct recording electronic voting machines enabling the voters to
vote secretly and independently without assistance. 87 Although the
court denied the motion for preliminary injunction,88 the suit had implications for thousands of voters.
6. Right To Live in the Community: DAI v. Paterson. -Disability
Advocates Inc., a P&A, brought this action on behalf of individuals
with mental illness in New York City seeking to live in communitybased supported housing. 89 The Bazelon Center, New York Lawyers
for the Public Interest, MFY Legal Services, Urban Justice Center, and
the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison joined them. 90
The trial court held that these 4300 individuals were entitled to live in
the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs. 91
7· Accessibility of City Sidewalks: Barden v. City of Sacramento.
- Plaintiffs, a group of individuals with mobility and vision impairments, filed a lawsuit against the City of Sacramento, alleging that the
City violated the ADA by failing to install curb ramps in newly constructed or altered sidewalks and by failing to maintain existing sidewalks to ensure accessibility by persons with disabilities. The lawyers
for plaintiffs were Disability Rights Advocates. 92 At the district court,
the City prevailed on its motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the argument
that sidewalks were not a public program, service, or activity and
therefore were not covered under Title TI of the ADA. Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court. 93 The
case then settled, setting a nationwide precedent requiring cities and
other public entities to make all public sidewalks accessible. The settlement provided that for up to thirty years, the City of Sacramento
86 See Goldstein Demchak Baller Borgen & Dardarian, Disability Rights, http://www.
gdblegal.com/Practice_Areas/Disability_Rights.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
87 Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
88 /d. at 1131-32.
89 See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
90 See Judge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, http://www.bazelon.org/incourt/docketldai.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
9! Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
92 See Disability Rights Advocates, Barden v. Sacramento, http://www.dralegal.org/cases/
public_entitieslbarden_v_sacramento.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
93 See Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F. 3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002).
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would allocate twenty percent of its annual transportation fund to
make the city's pedestrian rights-of-way accessible to individuals with
vision or mobility disabilities. This agreement included installation of
compliant curb ramps at intersections, removal of barriers that obstruct sidewalks (including narrow pathways, abrupt changes in level,
excessive cross slopes, and overhanging obstructions), and improvements in crosswalk access. 94
Although the above represent only a sample of cases brought by
disability cause lawyers, they are consistent with the overall trend of
movement attorneys primarily advancing claims that have implications beyond the individual clients whose interests they are dutybound to represent. 95 Moreover, to the extent that these cases arise
from representing only particular types of disabilities, they are not objectionable to individuals with other forms of disabilities and do not
raise the sort of tensions described throughout Law and Contradictions. These differences arise because disability cause lawyers have
gone to some lengths to craft remedies with the broadest possible implications, rather than ones that only serve their clients. And to the
extent that those remedies are disability-specific, the rulings also serve
to establish precedent and lay the groundwork for future claims.

IV. CAUSE LAWYERING WITHOUT THE SUPREME COURT
Part ill demonstrated the absence of movement advocates from the
design and argument of ADA cases eventually heard by the Supreme
Court, a phenomenon unique to disability rights cause lawyering. This
circumstance yields fertile ground from which to further engage Law
and Contradictions and to consider the future direction of disability
cause lawyering. The complete absence of Supreme Court cases
brought by disability cause lawyers has created even more of a vacuum for the tensions identified by Bagenstos to flourish. Given the
multiple goals embraced by the ADA, the various agendas put forward
in its passage, and the fragmented nature of the disability communi-

See Disability Rights Advocates, supra note 92.
This work continues in "real time." Stephanie Enyart, a law student sitting for the bar, was
recently represented by Disability Rights Advocates in Berkeley in a successful lawsuit for the
reasonable accommodation of a computer-assisted reading device on the bar exam. See Bob
Egelko, Bar Exam Company Fights Computer Aid for Blind Student, S.F. CHRON., Feb. I 1, 2010,
at C2. The American Council for the Blind, in connection with Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian and the Law Office of Lainey Feingold, recently entered into a structured negotiation with Major League Baseball whereby Major League Baseball agreed to make its website
and the websites of all thirty major league teams accessible for people who are blind or visually
impaired. See Law Office of Lainey Feingold, MLB Accessible Website Press Release, http:!/
lflegal.comhoiO/oz/mlb-press Oast visited Mar. 27, 2010).
94

95
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ty, 96 these tensions may be inevitable. But the lack of a centralized
movement agenda has removed Court decisions as an overt rallying
point around which society could debate key disability rights principles, at least in a way that disability cause lawyers might desire. 97
While highlighting tensions within the disability rights community,
Bagenstos does offer the social movement of disability as the closest
proxy to a unifying vision of the disability rights community and explains how this value is broadly expressed in the ADA (p. 18-20). We
suspect that Bagenstos would agree that this fragile unity does not
operate as a substitute for tactical decisions about how best to frame
litigation efforts to the movement's advantage, a key role of cause
lawyers.
In the absence of such efforts, the numerous and uncoordinated
strategies voiced by lawyers unconnected to the disability rights
movement have proliferated the tensions and contradictions presented
before the Supreme Court. While we agree with Bagenstos that the
ADA is underenforced, cause lawyers have been at the forefront of enforcing the ADA's nonemployment provisions and serve as an example
for what more robust public enforcement can aspire to achieve. We
ultimately suggest that disability cause lawyers reengage key portions
of the statute, in particular picking up some of the employment-driven
issues that have been dominated by non-cause lawyers up to this
point. As in past efforts, cause lawyers can and should continue their
successes in seeking systemic reform at the district court level, using
settlements to change the behavior of recalcitrant defendants. But we
also suggest that in discrete instances, they should be more active in
seeking Supreme Court adjudication.

A. Cause Lawyering in the Lower Federal Courts
The absence of Supreme Court cases brought by disability cause
lawyers is not accidental. Nor is it readily attributable to the vagaries
and unpredictability of the certiorari-granting process, or even a desire
on the part of the Court to avoid cause lawyer cases. During its October 1999 Term, for example, the Court granted certiorari in two ADA
cases: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 98 and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kir-

96 See jOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 41-73, 105-41 (1993); PaulK. Longmore, Disability Rights Movement,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN DISABILITY HISTORY 280, 285 (Susan Burch ed., 2009).
9 7 We acknowledge that it would be inaccurate to portray cause lawyering efforts on behalf of
any single movement as univocal. See generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF
CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); KENNETH W. MACK, RETHINKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERING AND
POLITICS IN THE ERA BEFORE BROWN 19 (2005); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, ros COLUM. L. REv. 1436, 1455-66 (2005).
98 525 U.S. ro63 (1999) (mem.).
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kingburg. 99 As discussed above, the lawyers for plaintiffs in these cases were not disability cause lawyers. 100 In the same Term, the Court
considered and denied petitions for certiorari in six other ADA cases.101 In these six cases, none of the lawyers who represented the
plaintiffs at the court of appeals or certiorari petition stage were disability cause lawyers. 102 Instead, the absence of disability cause lawyers
is a function of the unique situation in which they find themselves under the ADA. Although more work is needed to verify a complete lack
of cause lawyer cases in the ADA certiorari pool, the dearth is not surpnsmg. Using the sample of cause lawyer cases discussed above in
section III.C, 103 the cases at the Supreme Court (and those that would
have the best chance of getting there) were different in form and character from the non-cause lawyer cases. Almost all of the cases ultimately heard by the Court involved discrete questions of statutory in-

99

525 U.S. 1064 (1999) (mem.).
The lawyers who filed the petition for certiorari in Sutton were Van Aaron Hughes and
Thcker K. Trautman. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999) (No. 97-1943). Hughes is of counsel in the Denver office of Dorsey & Whitney.
His areas of emphasis (as described on his firm's website) are commercial litigation, including appellate advocacy, contract disputes, securities fraud litigation, antitrust, and intellectual property
litigation. See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Van Aaron Hughes Attorney Profile, http://www.dorsey.
com/hughes_aaron (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). Trautman practices in the areas of intellectual
property litigation, complex commercial litigation, antitrust, securities fraud, and regulatory law.
See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Thcker K. Trautman Attorney Profile, http://www.dorsey.com/
trautman_tucker/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). The lawyer for the Sutton plaintiffs at the Tenth
Circuit was Shawn D. Mitchell, a Colorado State legislator who keeps up a part-time law practice. See Colorado General Assembly, Shawn Mitchell, http://www.state.co.us/gov_dirlleg_dir/
senate/members/sen23.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). The lawyers for the Sutton plaintiffs at
the District Court were Trautman and Mitchell. The lawyer for the plaintiff in Albertson's at the
Ninth Circuit (and Supreme Court) was Scott Hunt, a partner in the three-lawyer firm of Busse &
Hunt in Portland, Oregon. His practice is focused heavily on employment, and subsequent to Albertson's, has come to include a significant portion of disability law. See Busse & Hunt, Scott N.
Hunt, http://www.busseandhunt.com/Firm%2oinfo/Lawyersii5o4340.aspx (last visited Mar. 27,
2010).
101 See Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 526 U.S. 1159 (1999), denying cert. to 157 F.3d 668 (9th
Cir. 1998); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Griffith, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999), denying cert. to Griffith v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998); Seaborn v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 525 U.S. 1144
(1999), denying cert. to 143 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998); Palm Beach Soil & Water Conservation
Dist. v. Bledsoe, 525 U.S. 826 (1998), denying cert. to Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816 (uth Cir. 1998); Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels, 525 U.S. 821
(1998), denying cert. to 137 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 1998); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 525 U.S. 819 (1998),
denying cert. to 136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998).
102 The lawyers who argued at the courts of appeals for these cases were as follows: John Emry
(Coolbaugh, 136 F.3d at 431), David William White (Christopher, 137 F.3d 1069); Isidro M. Garcia
(Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 817); Marie A. Mattox (Seaborn, 143 F.3d at 1406); Lee Hornberger (Griffith,
135 F.3d at 377); and Suzanne Dohrer (Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 669). Although some of these lawyers have employment and civil rights experience, none satisfy the definition of disability cause
lawyers as set out in this Review.
103 See supra pp. 1681-85.
100
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terpretation. 104 In many ways, these were defensive cases: the plaintiffs tried to vindicate a statutory right (to be granted a reasonable accommodation, to be treated equally in a privately owned place of public accommodation, and so forth), and the defendant raised an issue of
statutory interpretation as a defense. The fact that plaintiffs were individuals with "marginal" disabilities allowed the defendants to maneuver at least on the definition of disability. 105 Of course, it is the reality of litigation under a statute that anyone can (and should be able
to) litigate a case all the way to the Supreme Court to vindicate an individual right. But the distinction that Law and Contradictions does
not engage is that this reality is a far cry from cause lawyers using litigation to express a key movement principle. 106
Consider that in bringing nonemployment enforcement actions,
cause lawyers are attempting to achieve systemic justice at a level of
generality with which most disability advocates would agree. 107 They
are not trying to create new law, but rather to secure existing statutory
rights for the largest population possible. Many cause lawyer cases involve claims with individuals whose coverage under the ADA's definition of disability is beyond dispute. 108 One of the cases discussed
above settled, 109 and the only case in which a party even sought a writ
104 In Echazabal, for example, the question presented in the certiorari petition was "[w]hether a
person who is unable to carry out the essential functions of a job without incurring significant
risks to the person's own health or life is a 'qualified individual' who satisfies 'qualification standards' for that job within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act." Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at i, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (No. oo-1406). In Sutton,
the questions presented in the certiorari petition were: "(r) Where an airline pilot's uncorrected
vision is so poor that it constitutes a physical impairment under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, is the pilot nevertheless excluded from protection under the Act if her vision can be corrected? (2) Should courts defer to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Interpretive Guidance that disabilities should be analyzed in their uncorrected state? (3) Is a commercial pilot regarded as disabled by a major airline that refuses to employ her as a pilot for that
airline due to her poor vision?" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Sutton, 527 U.S. 471 (No. 971943).
105 See CAL. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2007 CALIFORNIA LABOR LAW DIGEST 8H>-I r
(2007) (noting that in ADA cases, an employee will not be considered disabled in circumstances
analogous to Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy).
106 "Cause lawyers, in short, are not simply carriers of a cause but are at the same time its producers: those who shape it, name it, and voice it." Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinski, Destruction of
Houses and Construction of a Cause: Lawyers and Bedouins in Israeli Courts, in POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS, supra note 17, at 227, 231.
107 Even in the employment accommodation area, one may identify many issues that unite disparate groups of people with different disabilities. The active participation of cause lawyers
would greatly facilitate this dynamic. See generally Stein & Waterstone, supra note 73.
108 In none of the cases discussed above in section lli.C, supra pp. r68r-85, was there a litigated issue as to whether the plaintiffs in fact met the ADA definition of disability.
109 In the talking ATM cases, the plaintiffs' attorneys do not routinely file lawsuits, but instead
proceed under a theory of "structured negotiations." Interview by Paul Halpern with Linda M.
Dardarian, Partner, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian (Apr. 12, 2008), http://
www.lawyersandsettlements.cornlarticles/dardarian-structured-negotiation.html. National Feder-
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of certiorari was Barden v. City of Sacramento, 110 in which the petitioners (unsuccessfully) sought Court adjudication. These lawsuits are
essentially enforcement actions, with an eye toward changing behavior
in a systemic fashion to impact the largest number of people. This
practice is in sharp contrast to the more atomistic nature of most of the
Supreme Court ADA cases.
In one sense, by bringing cases with broad reach, the disability
cause lawyers are following the institutional litigation traditions of
their civil rights predecessors. 111 As a statute with ambitious goals but
a modest remedial scheme, 112 the ADA is even more dependent than
predecessor civil rights statutes on professional cause lawyers. Given
developments in the private attorney payment scheme, 113 attorneys
whose work is not externally financed may have trouble sustaining
themselves, 114 and federal enforcement officials traditionally have not
made structural litigation a priority.llS Rather than bringing highprofile cases before the Supreme Court to change existing legal interpretations and social perceptions (the traditional top-down tenet of
movement lawyers), disability cause lawyers have engaged in the type
of activity usually seen as the province of public enforcement agencies
like the Department of Justice.
That disability cause lawyers have utilized nontraditional cause
lawyering tactics by foregoing the Supreme Court reflects their history.
Whereas the NAACP-era cause lawyers had first to litigate to remove
Jim Crow-era state laws, 116 women's rights groups dismantled socially

ation of the Blind ultimately settled. Astrue and Disability Advocates v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp.
2d I84 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), are still ongoing.
1 10 292 F.3d I073 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
111 See Waterstone, supra note 21, at 455-57.
112 See generally Ruth Colker, ADA Title Ill: A Fragile Compromise, 2I BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 377 (2ooo); Waterstone, supra note I r.
113 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2ooi) (holding that plaintiffs must achieve a material alteration of the legal relationship of
the parties - such as a favorable judgment on the merits or a consent decree - to receive attorneys' fees); see also Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REv.
I087 (2007) (discussing Buckhannon's negative effects on private organizations that bring civil
rights cases).
114 In one sense, the existence of private lawyers in Table 3, supra pp. 1679-SI, argues against
this idea. But virtually none of these organizations does exclusively disability rights advocacy.
The high-volume lawyers, who may focus more attention in that area, traditionally bring cases in
states like California, whose laws contain a remedial scheme more robust than the ADA's.
115 See Waterstone, supra note 2 I , at 45 7.
·
116 See ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 47, 48 (3d ed. 2005) ("Margold's
[(Nathan Margold, the drafter of the NAACP's master plan)] plan was to move the Supreme
Court toward the ultimate goal in small steps .... The first prong was directed at eliminating segregation laws that did not require equality along with separation. The second prong was directed
at eliminating segregation in states where the inequality was endemic and therefore discriminate-
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constructed rules that restricted workplace opportunities and sexual
and reproductive freedoms,ll7 and the gay rights movement has put
significant emphasis on changing prevailing interpretations of state
and federal constitutions, 118 disability cause lawyers have faced a different social reality. Even before the ADA, several states had progressive laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, public services, and private accommodations. 119
As
Bagenstos demonstrates, and as others have recounted in more detail,
disability cause lawyers built on this foundation and played a monumental role in achieving passage of the ADA, 120 which arguably remains the world's most progressive disability antidiscrimination legislation.121 Those efforts, as well as earlier ones, 122 invested these
lawyers in movement goals and endowed them with credibility. This
legitimacy is not exclusive to cause lawyers. However, people with
such dedication to this area (made up in part, we suspect, from their
own experiences as people with disabilities or having family members

ry.'); see also 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 830 (1964) (discussing the
NAACP's shift "from legal defense to legal offense").
11 7 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding that overly restrictive regulation on maternity leave in public schools violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause mandates that administrators of estates be named in a way that does not discriminate
between sexes); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy).
118 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (unsuccessful constitutional challenge to
Georgia sodomy statute); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (successful constitutional challenge to Texas sodomy statute); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that samesex couples have an equal right to marry under California's Equal Protection Clause, superseded
by constitutional amendment, CAL. CON ST. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California. 'l
119 See PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 734-37 (2d
ed. 2009).
120 See Ziv, supra note 17.
121 See 137 CONG. REC. 19,530 (1991) (statement of Sen. Simon) ("[T]he United States had, by
virtue of enacting the ADA, become the world leader in establishing rights and opportunities for
persons with disabilities .... [O]ther countries are looking to us for leadership.'~; President George
H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1067, 1068 Guly 26, 1990) (stating that the ADA "is the world's first comprehensive declaration of
equality for people with disabilities" and "has made the United States the international leader on
this human rights issue').
122 Perhaps the seminal litigation campaign for the rights of people with disabilities was a sustained challenge to the deplorable conditions in Bryce Hospital, a state institution in Alabama, in
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). On the role of cause lawyers in the Wyatt
campaign, see L. RALPH }ONES & RICHARD R. PARLOUR, WYAIT V. STICKNEY: RETROSPECT
AND PROSPECT (1981). On pre-ADA disability cause lawyering, see SUSAN M. OLSON,
CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984).
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with disabilities) have especial insight into the lived experiences of
people with disabilities that may not extend beyond that community. 123
Instead of charging constitutional windmills - a dubious prospect
after the 1985 Supreme Court decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc. 124 declared rational basis as the Equal Protection
Clause standard of review for disability discrimination 125 - cause
lawyers have naturally tended to focus on enforcing existing statutory
rights. In trying to achieve the greatest good for the largest number of
people, it is understandable that disability cause lawyers have tended
to focus their efforts on cases outside the employment realm, where
they stand the greatest chance of success at the district court level and
can avoid federal court skittishness at aggregating plaintiff interests
within the employment relationship. 126 Disability cause lawyers primarily exist in a post-"Hollow Hope" 127 world, where there is healthy
skepticism about using the Supreme Court as a tool to change the
lived experiences of a targeted group. These movement lawyers also
have been savvy enough to engage a legal mobilization framework, 128
where litigation functions as a bargaining chip in negotiations, rather
than as an end to be achieved. By directly controlling settlement
terms, these advocates have avoided relying on the judiciary for enforcement that courts are institutionally ill-equipped and indisposed to
handle. This situation is compounded by disability cause lawyers' being in the unique civil rights position of needing to enforce an existing
statute rather than the more historical one of needing the Court to
break down existing barriers using constitutional means. This vision
of the disability rights movement - to enforce existing nonemployment rights through district court litigation by settling most cases
along the way- is an omission from Law and Contradictions's exceptionally thoughtful account of the interaction between the disability
rights movement and the legal landscape. Neglecting the cause lawyers also elides the harder question of how the Court's ADA jurisprudence might have evolved in response to the type of unified disability
rights movement for which Bagenstos wisely advocates.

123 See generally ]AMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT Us: DISABILITY
OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT (1998).
124 473 U.S. 432 (r985).
12 5 I d. at 441-42.
126 See Waterstone, supra note 1 r (noting greater litigation successes in Title IT and Title Ill
cases); see also Stein & Waterstone, supra note 73, at 903-<>4 (discussing failures of Title I cases
but successes in Title II and Title Ill in pursing collective remedies).
127 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (rst ed. 1991).
128 For a general discussion of legal mobilization, see MICHAEL W. McCANN, RIGHTS AT
WORK (1994).
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B. Impact of Absence of Cause Lawyer Cases
from the Supreme Court

Amicus briefs and the kind of defensive maneuvering used in Hason129 are at the margins. Real control over a case resides in the lawyers who decide to bring it in the first place and who ultimately control whether and how the case will proceed. Disability rights cause
lawyers have largely been absent from these key decisions. This absence has had important consequences for both the cases that have
been brought and the manner in which they have been portrayed.
Consider, for example, the nature of the claimant's disability. One
aspect of Supreme Court ADA litigation that has undercut the goals of
the disability rights movement - and differentiated it from prior
cause-oriented movements and their attorneys 130 - is the unsympathetic nature of the clients and fact patterns that appeared before the
Court. 131 Given the lack of involvement by disability rights cause
lawyers in Court cases - beginning with the district court trials - it
is perhaps unsurprising that many of these cases did not involve individuals and circumstances that advocates would have hoped for in the
first round of ADA litigation. 132
This was especially salient in the employment cases in which the
plaintiffs' alleged disabilities combined with their allegations of discrimination created discomfort for judges and provided ready fodder
for lampoon and scorn in the popular media. 133 For example, Sutton
129 See Hasan v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d u67 (9th Cir. 2002); see also supra pp. 1676-77.
!30 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High
Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 457, 489 (2009) ("The NAACP lawyers recruited plaintiffs for their cases based on the parties' ability best to represent the legal claims the
lawyers sought to advance.'); see also Barclay & Marshall, supra note 18, at 194 (describing plaintiffs in Vermont gay marriage litigation, who were in "committed relationships, [] were financially
secure, [and] were respected members of their communities 'living quiet lives"' (citations omitted)); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: Clarifying Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 5 II, 519
(2003) ("For instance, if the judiciary proves sympathetic to a particular gay identity - e.g., homosexual as respectable family member - advocates will use such identity to obtain desirable
results and to meet client needs.'). But see BROOKS ET AL., supra note n6, at 48 (describing the
NAACP's early case of Hocutt v. Wilson, Civ. No. 1-188 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 1933), where
NAACP lawyers discovered on cross-examination that their client was not qualified for admission
into pharmacy school).
131 See, e.g., Michael D. Reisman, Traveling "To the Farthest Reaches of the ADA," or Taking
Aim at Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Perceived Disability?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
2121, 2143-44 (2005) (discussing the nearsighted pilot plaintiffs in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), as unsympathetic).
132 Cf Soifer, Disabling the ADA, supra note 56, at 1289-90 (criticizing ·swing voters on the
Court for employing a "stealth strategy," id. at 1290, when selecting ADA cases).
133 See generally Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler's Despair: The
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 223 (2000).
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v. United Air Lines, Inc. 134 involved twin plaintiffs with severe myopia who sought accommodations as airline pilots. 135 This situation
created problems from the outset. In addition to the general question
of weighing disability rights against public safety, 136 the question of
whether everyone with corrective lenses should benefit from civil
rights protection initiated fears that litigation floodgates would open
and drown federal dockets. 137 Similarly, Toyota Motor Manufacturing
v. Williams 138 and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 139 involved
claims by individuals with what some might consider marginal disabilities (carpal tunnel syndrome and high blood pressure, respectively),
which fed into fears that the ADA could become a runaway statute if
not vigorously policed. 140 At a very early stage, these concerns placed
the definition of disability at the center of attention, and the resulting
narrowing interpretations - although drawn from outlier fact patterns
-set the stage for the next decade of ADA litigation. 141
The absence of Supreme Court cases brought by disability cause
lawyers has created an odd vacuum. Although a full appraisal of the
ADA requires in-depth examination of more than Supreme Court decisions, these cases cast a long shadow in terms of doctrinal impact, influence on public opinion, and symbolism. 142 For better or worse, Su134

527 U.S. 471.
I d. at 475.
136 See, e.g., Walter Olson, Disabling America, NAT'L REv., May 5, 1997, at 40 (noting that
ADA lawsuits are on a collision course with public safety).
137 At the oral argument in Sutton, Justice Scalia waved his glasses in the air, noting that under
the plaintiffs' preferred definition of the statute, seven out of nine Supreme Court Justices could
count as protected class members, as could a majority of Americans. See Walter Olson, Under the
ADA, We May All Be Disabled, WALL ST.]., May 17, 1999, at A27. The issue of eyeglasses and
disability was resolved by a specific provision in the ADA Amendments Act expressly excluding
this population. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553,
3556 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2oo8); 42 U.S.C. § 12103 (Supp. II 2008)).
138 534 u.s. 184 (2002).
139 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
140 See generally Ruth E. Sternglantz, Raining on the Parade of Horribles: Of Slippery Slopes,
Faux Slopes, and Justice Scalia's Dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1100
(2005) (describing and critiquing the "slippery slope" argument in which judges "highlight[] the
dire effects of proximately potential future decisions that are likely to result from the present
case").
141 See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,
42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539 (1997) ("The restrictions on the term 'disability,' imposed in the name
of reserving the protection of the statute for 'the truly disabled,' have caught many plaintiffs with
serious, highly disabling conditions in their webs.').
14 2 For treatments of the civil rights movement expressed through the lens of important Supreme Court cases, see, for example, GILLES & GOLUBOFF, supra note 45; ]OHN R. HOWARD,
THE SHIFTING WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO BROWN (1999); MICHAEL]. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007); MICHAEL]. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS (2004); and TUSHNET, supra note 4 I.
135
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preme Court cases also drive academic discussion. There is a tendency
in academic circles to "romance the Court" 143 and to describe law and
social movements through the prism of Supreme Court adjudication.
This situation has played out in the context of the ADA, where much
ink has been spilled over the Court's definition-of-disability decisions.144 The thrust of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was to "correct'' these decisions. 145 To his credit, Bagenstos takes a broader approach and derives the themes and tensions of disability rights thought
from a broad range of sources and scholarship (pp. 12-33). But many
of the important conflicts identified by Law and Contradictions as inherent to the disability rights movement have been exacerbated by the
lack of a unifying agenda provided by cause lawyers at the Supreme
Court. Put another way, the hodgepodge of advocacy advanced by
non-cause lawyers on behalf of their individual clients seeking individual remedies has highlighted prior tensions and contradictions.
Before the disability rights movement centered around the ADA,
Supreme Court litigation was a focal point to articulate key values of
other civil rights movements. In the desegregation campaign, cause
lawyers intentionally maneuvered the claim of "separate but equal" as
inherently unequal before the Court. Women's cause lawyers developed protection for sexual and reproductive freedom through constitutional privacy protection by arguing landmark cases such as Griswold
v. Connecticut1 46 and Roe v. Wade. 147 In the gay rights movement, although advocates have resisted the temptation to put the issue of marriage equality before the United States Supreme Court (while doing so
in numerous state supreme courts), 148 there has been confluence and
coordination on the right to privacy and liberty in sexual relations resulting in its decriminalization by the Court in Lawrence. 149 The con143 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 564 (2009) ("If scholars want to understand the capacity of the Justices to influence democratic deliberation, they
need to focus on that deliberation and on social movements, not on the Court. Focusing only on
the Court will inevitably overstate its role .... [W]hy, in the face of decades of social science research, [do]legal academics continue their endless quest to find judicial influence, to romance the
Court[?]"). For an example of scholarship moving beyond a Court-centered approach to address
social change, see McCANN, supra note 128.
144 See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 141; ChaiR. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2ooo); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587 (1997); Soifer, Disabling the ADA, supra note 56; Soifer, The Disability Term, supra note 56.
14 5 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. II0-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
146 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
147 410 u.s. Il3 (1973).
148 See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v.
Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1501--o4 (2006).
149 See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 1639-40.
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elusion is subtle: Contemporary cause lawyers need not control their
respective movements as they did in previous waves of civil rights litigation. However, their involvement in bringing and litigating cases up
to the Supreme Court has been a unifying force for prior movements
in identifying core values, and such a contribution remains a necessary
and missing ingredient for disability rights advocacy. Indeed, this
harmonizing dynamic is exactly what Bagenstos identifies as the missing feature necessary for the future success of the American disability
rights movement.
To be sure, even without the direct involvement of cause lawyers, a
minority of the Supreme Court's ADA cases have raised key movement values. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,I 50 for example, should
appropriately be viewed as the struggle of the disability rights community to be free from paternalistic views of what is deemed best for
their welfare. 151 Similarly, the right to live in the community instead
of in an institution, at issue in Olmstead v. L.C., 152 is a fundamental
and longstanding principle of the disability movementl 53 about which
the movement's cause lawyers sought Court hearings. 154 But other
cases are notable for the extent to which they only peripherally address
important movement values. For example, both the underlying claims
in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. ISS (lack of physical access on
cruise ships and disability-related surcharges 156 ) and the legal issue before the Supreme Court (extraterritorial reach of the ADA) are oblique
to the lived experiences and concerns of most Americans with disabilities. Three of the more prominent Supreme Court ADA cases 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
This argument is raised and analogized to the parallel struggle of women to be free of paternalistic assumptions as expressed in Johnson Controls. See Anita Silvers et aL, Disability and
Employment Discrimination at the Rehnquist Court, 75 Miss. L.}. 945 (2006). What is deeply
ironic and disturbing in Echazabal is the insistence by the Court that the clearly paternalistic ruling is not the type of paternalism the ADA seeks to combat See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 85-86, 85
n.5152 527 u.s. 581 (1999).
153 See generally INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE (Nancy M.
Crewe & Irving Kenneth Zola eds., 1983); DUANE F. STROMAN, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2003); University of California, Berkeley, The Disability Rights and Independent
Living Movement, http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/collections/drilm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
154 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding as constitutionally invalid a local zoning ordinance that had the effect of prohibiting mentally retarded
individuals from living in the community). Other Court cases also went to the issue of conditions
within institutions. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. r (1981). Cause lawyer David Ferleger was involved in several of
these cases. See David Ferleger: Attorney, http://www.ferleger.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
155 545 U.S. Il9 (2005).
156 Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged that because only four cabins in each ship were ADA
accessible, potential passengers with disabilities were not allowed to participate in advance purchase discount programs and were thereby assessed surcharges. Complaint, Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., No. H-oo-2649 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2000).
ISO
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Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,t 57 Tennessee
v. Lane, 158 and United States v. Georgia 159 - had at their core legal
issues that were part of a larger federalism project undertaken by the
Rehnquist Court. 160 These cases clearly involved important disability
rights issues: the right to be treated equally by the state in publicly run
programs, services, and activities. The advocates who argued these
cases, particularly at the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court,
were talented and had significant civil rights experience. 161 They were
aware that larger disability rights issues existed in these cases, and
they made use of these issues in their arguments. 162 But that is a different project than having cause lawyers engineer cases from the
ground up to establish and extend the scope of ADA coverage.
Further, when Law and Contradictions highlights conflicts within
positions held by various members of the disability rights movement
that are reflected in the menagerie of Supreme Court ADA cases, it
does so with the benefit of hindsight. For although Bagenstos adroitly
aligns precepts within the Court's decisions with disability rights
movement tensions - and wisely counsels for reconciliation of those
disagreements - without cause lawyers and in the absence of different
strands of disability rights presented before the Court, the occasional
presence of core precepts must be viewed as serendipitous, rather than
as reflecting an active choice from among conflicting values. This is
not to say that opposing themes would not exist without being fully
vetted by cause lawyers at the Supreme Court. Bagenstos demonstrates to the contrary in Law and Contradictions and has himself orchestrated and argued two core cases: Lane, which raised the issue of
courthouse access by two wheelchair users,1 63 and Echazabal, which
challenged a paternalistic exclusion from work of an individual with a
liver condition. 164 But one is left to wonder how different the Rehnquist Court's ADA jurisprudence would have been had cause lawyers
led a unified movement in bringing cases before the Supreme Court.

157 53 I
158 54 I
159 546

u.s. 356 (200I).
u.s. 509 (2004).
u.s. IS I (2006).

160 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, III YALE L.]. II41 (2002).
161 Among these advocates were Professors Bagenstos, Pamela Karlan, and Michael
Gottesman.
162 See generally Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric
Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31 (2001); Brief for the Private Respondents at 7, UJne, S4I U.S. 509
(No. 02-1667), 2003 WL 22428029 at *7 ("Title II operate[s] broadly to protect individuals with
disabilities against being effectively shut out of opportunities to have access to and influence on
their state governments.').
163 Lane, 541 U.S. at 513.
164 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002).
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Such an effort would have required exactly the type of reconciliation
and strategic thinking shrewdly advocated by Law and Contradictions.

V. LOOKING AHEAD
We have demonstrated how the nontraditional role of cause lawyers, while effective in helping enforce the nonemployment provisions
of the ADA, has created space for the tensions identified in Law and
Contradictions to flourish. Although our project of examining and
critiquing disability cause lawyers is ongoing, the interaction of cause
lawyers' efforts to date with Bagenstos's thesis provides some initial
insights into what cause lawyers might consider when moving
forward.
Happily, we may be on the threshold of an exciting time in disability cause lawyering, and Bagenstos may be in a position to help usher
in this new era. With the Obama Administration, we now have a
President and an Attorney General who view civil rights as a top
priority. 165 As part of this agenda, the President has appointed a
number of well-informed activists to high-level Justice Department positions, including Bagenstos. Many of the Administration's appointees
to key federal enforcement positions have a track record of disability
advocacy and are on (at least the academic) record as arguing for more
vigorous enforcement. 166 Building on the successes cause lawyers have
had in enforcing the nonemployment provisions of the ADA, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Justice Department are already showing more leadership on these issues. 167
In addition to partnering with public enforcement officials, cause
lawyers should reclaim parts of Title I of the ADA by exerting more
control over litigation and its messaging. We believe that disability
cause lawyers, by building on their initial successes, can reinvigorate
the ADA's antidiscrimination agenda, which is at least as important as
moving toward universalist extrastatutory measures. Given the ADA's
reliance on private enforcement, it is extremely unlikely that cause

165 Charlie Savage, Justice Department To Recharge Civil Rights Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2009, at AI (quoting Attorney General Holder's statement that the civil rights division
will be "getting back to doing what it has traditionally done'').
166 Bagenstos is one of these officials. See Samuel Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and the
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 101 NW. U. L. REv. 1459, 146o-62 (2007) (noting shortcomings of the
private attorney general model of enforcing civil rights). Chai Feldblum, one of the architects of
the ADA, has been nominated as an EEOC Commissioner. Feldblum has been a consistent advocate of meaningful enforcement of that statute. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 144.
167 The EEOC recently announced that it had settled a class action case against Sears, Roebuck and Co. for $6.2 million. This is the EEOC's largest ADA settlement to date. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Sears, Roebuck To Pay $6.2 Million for
Disability Bias (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://archive.eeoc.gov/press/9-29-o9.htrnl.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. r23:r6s8

lawyers can control the Court's docket. No group m any movement
can.r6s
Moreover, the type of control over litigation strategy exerted by
cause lawyers in other movements has its own problems and is controversial. Contrary to the image often portrayed in early accounts of the
years leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, there was substantial dissent within the black community as to what the objectives of
any campaign to overthrow American apartheid ought to be and how
best to achieve them. 169 There were also blacks who benefited from
certain aspects of segregation or who opposed racial mixing. By exerting control (sometimes brutally) over the cases that would be brought
to challenge "separate but equal," over the arguments advanced in
those cases, and over how the overall struggle was presented to and
understood by both the black community and the public at large,
Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and the other lawyers
affiliated with the NAACP were able to manage these internal tensions
(albeit often with great difficulty) to present a coherent litigation strategy in the period leading up to and for many years after Brown. 170 Although many scholars now legitimately question some of the implications of allowing one group to so dominate the debate over racial
equality, few argue that the black equality movement would have been
better off without the work of this dedicated band of cause lawyers 171
or that the overarching litigation mission was not successful. 172 These
black cause lawyers were able successfully to establish a coherent stepby-step litigation strategy that papered over and ultimately transcended these differences by persuading the overwhelming majority of
blacks- and a large enough number of whites- to support their basic antidiscrimination and integrationist agenda. 173
16 8 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (challenging the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8). This case has garnered attention for its high-profile legal
team of Theodore Olson and David Boies, two politically opposed lawyers who joined forces in
support of gay marriage expressly for the purpose of placing the issue before the United States
Supreme Court. See Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join To Fight Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2009, at Ar. Neither of these lawyers has a history with the gay rights movement that would suggest they are viewed as cause lawyers for that group's civil rights.
169 See MARK V. TUSH NET, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1995); see also MACK, supra
note 97.
170 See generally TUSHNET, supra note 41.
171 For a selection of scholarship critical of the NAACP, see DERRICK A. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION A:--ID THE U:--IFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL
REFORM (2004); GOLUBOFF, supra note 97; and Brown-Nagin, supra note 97. Of these three
critics, Professor Bell is arguably the only one to claim that black Americans would have been
better off without Brown. See Derrick A. Bell, Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185 Gack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
liZ See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE (2003).
173 See ]VA:--1 WILLIAMS, EYES 0:--1 THE PRIZE (1987).
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As we discussed above, given political realities, the decisions of
cause lawyers not to focus on a Supreme Court litigation strategy are
defensible, and their success should be applauded. But there are still
areas of the statute where the right case or cases brought with an eye
toward the Supreme Court could be useful. Even if the Supreme
Court would not readily do much to help the disability movement, it
can continue to harm it doctrinally as well as contribute to an increasingly negative popular vision of disability rights. We suggest that
disability cause lawyers have a role in reinvigorating the ADA's antidiscrimination potential - specifically, by reframing the existing and
atomistic vision of what comprises reasonable accommodation, and focusing on employment failure-to-hire cases. This agenda might ultimately involve engaging the Court and nudging it slowly toward a different vision of disability rights under the ADA. 174
As discussed above, most "harmful" ADA precedents - and those
to which Bagenstos has devoted most discussion in Law and Contradictions - center on the ADA's employment provisions. 175 Understanding the central role that reasonable workplace accommodations
play in fostering independence, social integration, and agency, disability cause lawyers might have sculpted a reasonable accommodation
case into one with systemic impact for the entire movement. In Law
and Contradictions, Bagenstos offers a deeply nuanced view of the
theoretical underpinnings and normative defensiveness of the concept
of reasonable accommodation (pp. ro-rz). But cause lawyers are
faced with a more immediate and tangible issue: what does "reasonable accommodation" mean under the terms of the statute? The terrain
here is relatively open: despite efforts made during the ADA's passage,176 Title I of the ADA itself contains no precise definition of "reasonable accommodation," but instead gives general principles and illustrative examples. 177 The one Supreme Court case touching on this
issue in the employment context, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,l 78 had
174 On whether the Supreme Court's ADA docket was "inevitable," see Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and
Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 CEo. WASH. L. REV. 522, 575 (2008).
175 Bagenstos is not alone here in focusing on Title I. It has driven the ADA academic discussion. See Waterstone, supra note u, at I811-I2.
176 See BLANCK ET AL., supra note I I 9, at 6o-63 (discussing objections to the ADA, including
problems with the "open-ended nature of the ADA's central terms," id. at 62).
177 The statutory definition is: "The term 'reasonable accommodation' may include- (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.
§ I211I(9) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
178 535 U.S. 39I (2002).
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several disadvantages from the outset. It dealt with a request for a
variance from an established seniority policy - a tough hurdle for
the Court to overcome - and had a plaintiff with a back injury, no
doubt viewed by many as a common injury and at most a marginal
disability. 1 79
Several cases raising this issue (not brought by cause lawyers) were
denied certiorari. In McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 180 the plaintiff, an individual with anxiety disorders (including panic disorder and
somatoform disorders), requested the reasonable accommodation of a
job transfer. He asserted he would benefit from and was entitled to
this transfer, 181 and indeed similarly situated employees without disabilities had been given transfers of this nature. 182 The defendant declined. Similarly, in Sheren v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 183 the plaintiff, a
sales associate hired in a furniture department, had a degenerative eye
condition that led to declining vision. She requested that, as a reasonable accommodation, her employer install a stationary high-powered
magnifying machine that would allow her to continue her work.
While conceding that the plaintiff's performance had been at least average, the defendant declined to make the accommodation.
Given the idiosyncratic nature of ADA jurisprudence, leadership by
cause lawyers on this issue might still be possible. Almost two decades
after the passage of the ADA, most of its jurisprudence (certainly in
the employment area) has been dominated by cases interpreting its definition of disability. Apart from Barnett, there are no employment
cases defining the contours of reasonable accommodation despite the
lack of clear statutory guidance. With the ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Congress has sent a clear signal to the courts that it is time to
move past this narrow issue. 184 The moment is ripe for disability
cause lawyers to identify a plaintiff with an unquestionable disability
(say a blind individual) who sought a fairly uncontroversial accommodation (say, a screen magnifier) whose cost would not satisfy the criteria for an undue hardship defense under the ADA. Placing this type of
plaintiff before the Court would force the Court to define the scope

179 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, US Airways v. Barnett and the Limits of Disability Accommodation, in GILLES & GOLUBOFF, supra note 45, at 323.

192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).
/d. at I23D--3I.
I d. at 12 36-38.
183 No. 98-3166, 1999 WL 98046 (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 1999).
184 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. uo-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 ("The
purposes of this Act are ... to convey congressional intent that ... the primary object of attention
in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.").
180
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182
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and content of a reasonable accommodation. 185 Such jurisprudence
would also have great reach, as international law has increasingly
adopted the reasonable accommodation mandate, but has yet to interpret it. 186
Another project might involve failure-to-hire cases - the hardest
employment cases to bring and to prosecute, in large part because bias
and discrimination at the hiring stage are more difficult to establish. 187
Employment testing can be useful here, as it has been in other areas,
to ferret out difficult-to-detect discrimination. 188 But because the
damages in failure-to-hire cases are lower, and because testing is expensive, private lawyers have not typically utilized testing. Bagenstos
suggests that public enforcement officials should do so (p. 135). This
change would be a welcome development, and one for which one of
the authors here has previously advocated. 189
But using testing in failure-to-hire cases should not be so easily left
to public officials. As detailed herein, disability cause lawyers have
shown themselves to be resourceful and tenacious in enforcing the
nonemployment provisions of the ADA. If they were to dedicate some
of their efforts to bringing testing cases, it could yield benefits in
changing the tone of ADA employment litigation, which has been
dominated by individualized requests for reasonable accommodation
and thoroughly sidetracked by definitional issues. Although these cases might not contain legal issues that would warrant Supreme Court
attention, they could publicly document what knowledgeable observers
suspect is sadly prevalent: driven by bias and stigma, employers - either consciously or unconsciously - are less likely to hire workers

185 For an exhaustive account, see Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability
Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003).
186 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 6r1Io6, supra note 27; Council Directive 2000/78, Establishing a General
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 0.]. (L 303) r6 (EC}. See
generally Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Accessing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in EQUALITY AND ECONOMIC, SoCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Malcolm Langford & Eibe Reidel eds., 2010).
18 7 This is true across civil rights statutes, but is even more amplified under the ADA. See Steven L. Willborn, The Nonevolution of Enforcement Under the ADA: Discharge Cases and the Hiring Problem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
103, ro3-o4 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) ("[O]ver the short life of the ADA, the ratio of discharge to hiring cases has been about ro to r, a ratio that is substantially higher than for Title Vll
cases ... .').
188 See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1401, 1426 (1998} ("[T]esting has proved to be an effective means
of documenting discrimination:'); see also Michael ]. Yelnowsky, Filling an Enforcement Void:
Using Testers To Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level
Jobs, 26 U. MICH. ].L. REFORM 403, 413 (1993) ("Testing can help root out discriminatory practices where the disincentives to bring a private suit result in underenforcement. ").
189 See Waterstone, supra note 21, at 471-74·
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with disabilities. 190 Disability cause lawyer leadership on this issue
could offer an example to similar struggles of other minority groups,
who continue to be subject to stigma and bias at the hiring stage. 191 It
could also offer a very powerful display of a type of discrimination
some forces believe no longer exists.
These are steps cause lawyers can and should take to work within
the antidiscrimination framework the ADA sets forth. In doing so, it is
our hope that cause lawyers can reclaim the capacity of law to create
social change, 192 a goal that we share with Bagenstos. While we also
find ourselves agreeing with many of the extrastatutory reforms Bagenstos proposes, including public health insurance, we are wary of the
disability community placing too many eggs in the universalist basket.
As evidenced by the problems many people with disabilities face under
the current iteration of "general" social programs, 193 it is unlikely that
any project, like health care programs, would be tailored to completely
address the unique needs of people with disabilities. As Bagenstos acknowledges, there is much still to be gained through a reinvigorated
enforcement and even expansion of existing antidiscrimination principles embodied in the ADA.

190 The 2004 National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities
found, as in previous years, that the most prevalent form of discrimination against people with
disabilities in employment is not being offered a job for which one is qualified. The second most
common is being refused a job interview on the basis of disability. See NAT'L ORG. ON DISABILITY, 2004 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 7 (2004). This
statistic is not limited to service sector jobs: the State Bar of California's Committee on Legal Professionals with Disabilities reported that nearly half of the respondents it surveyed believed that
they were denied employment opportunities because of their disabilities. AM. BAR ASS'N
COMM'N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE·ON
THE EMPLOYMENT OF LAWYERS WITH DISABILITIES 10-1 I (2006), available at http://www.
abanet.org/disability/docs/conf_report_final.pdf.
191 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON.
REv. 991 (2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873 (finding that simply having an
African American-sounding name significantly decreased one's opportunity to receive a job interview, regardless of occupation or industry).
192 See Christopher W. Schmidt, "Freedom Comes Only from the Law": The Debate over Law's
Capacity and the Making of Brown v. Board of Education, 2008 UTAH L. REV. I493 (arguing that
legal reform helped make possible the change in prejudicial attitudes and customs during the civil
rights era). On the need for a contextualized strategy to create social change, utilizing both legal
and extralegal measures, see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism, I20 HARV. L. REV.
937, 987 (2007).
193 See Michael E. Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Policy, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. I08I (2010) (discussing work disincentives for people with disabilities under existing federal
programs); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. I, 26
(2004).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Law and Contradictions is a deeply thoughtful contribution to disability law and policy jurisprudence, as befits the work of one of its
leading scholars. The diagnoses and prescriptions offered by Bagenstos, untethered to any disability rights party line or trope, are insightful and convincing. This Review, while agreeing with most of the
assertions in Law and Contradictions, also engages an area almost
wholly absent from the book as well as the general literature: the role
of disability cause lawyers. These lawyers exist, and their unacknowledged efforts may provide an opportunity for these advocates, the
disability rights movement, and the wider civil rights and cause lawyering communities to contribute to one another.

